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Abstract
This thesis considers how conscientious objection of a nurse or physician in a rural setting
should be addressed when that objection is based on a centrally held value or belief, and
considers whether current strategies are morally sufficient. Current literature fails to
specifically consider the complexity and challenge facing health care professionals with
limited support, time, and resources who encounter conscientious objection in the rural
environment. Conscience and conscientious objection are explicitly defined based on a
literature survey, and reflective equilibrium is used to assess evidence from law, policy, and
published sources. The author concludes that current strategies fail to meet moral obligations
to rural nurses and physicians and recommends a strategy of accountability and openness
requiring physicians, nurses, and administrators to defend their reasons for conscientious
objection and expecting peers and subordinates to respect objections that qualify as
conscience based. This strategy provides an "at the bedside" method for ensuring objections
are documented, allowing for accountability at all levels of care.

Keywords
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

The goal of this thesis is to consider how conscientious objection of a nurse, nurse
practitioner, or physician in a rural setting should be addressed, when that objection is
based on a centrally held value or belief, and to examine whether current strategies are
morally sufficient.
Technological advances have changed the kinds of treatments that nurses and doctors can
provide, in situations ranging from family planning (e.g. "Plan B" emergency
contraceptives) to artificially prolonging life using ventilators, feeding tubes, etc.
(Dickens & Cook, 2000; Fielder, 2005; Garcia, 2007) . As a result, recent scholarly
attention in bioethics has focused on the role of conscience within medicine (Dimmitt &
Artnak, 1994; May, 2001; Strom-Gottfried, 2007). Conscientious objection, the refusal
to provide a service or treatment based on a value or conscious belief, was brought to the
forefront by global pandemic concerns in 2003 with the emergence of Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). Doctors, nurses, and nurse practitioners needed to choose
between reporting to work and treating an illness of unknown virulence and fatality, or
refusing to work in order to protect family members (especially young children and the
elderly), from potential exposure to the illness (Sokol, 2003). The challenge of resolving
conflicts between competing duties to society, patients, employers, and family continues
to spur discussion. Curlin, Lawrence, Chin, and Lantos (2007) conducted a study looking
at how doctors view and react to value conflicts with treatment options. A portion of
doctors in the study indicated that they had failed to inform patients of treatment options
in situations of conscientious objection (Curlin et al., 2007). This raises concerns that
conscientious objections affect the care that patients receive.
In rural communities, limited numbers of Health Care Professionals (HCPs), increased
complexity and severity of emergency cases, and limited resources all increase the
challenge of addressing conflicts of conscience (Cook & Hoas, 2008; Mitura & Bollman,
2003; Nagarajan, 2004; Rosenthal, 2006). In this thesis Health Care Professional (HCP)
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refers specifically to doctors, nurses and nurse practitioners. Cook and Hoas (2008) and
Nelson and Weeks (2006) conducted literature reviews of resources specifically used in,
and created for, addressing rural ethical conflicts experienced by HCPs. Of those
resources, none addressed conscientious objection in a rural setting.
The current standard for conscientious objection in a life-threatening situation without the
ability to transfer care requires nurses and doctors to lay aside personal conflicts and
provide care (Canadian Medical Association, 2004; Canadian Nurses Association,
2008a). In such a situation, when patient transfer to another provider or an urban center
(in the case of smaller rural communities) is not possible, a conscientious objection
carries a sufficiently negative consequence that it is reasonable to assume that some
people would conclude objecting is morally reprehensible.

1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this thesis is to consider whether current strategies used to address
conscientious objection of HCPs working in rural communities in Canada are morally
sufficient. This was undertaken using the method of reflective equilibrium to consider the
current practice context of HCPs working in a rural setting, as well as the regulations and
policies in place to guide these HCPs.

1.2 Overview of the chapters
This thesis is presented in monograph format. Chapter II contains a review of the
pertinent literature including explications of key terminology and scholarly positions in
the areas of duty, conscience and conscientious objection, and moral distress.
Additionally, the term "rural" is defined as it is used in this thesis, and specific
considerations from the preceding three areas are revisited as they relate specifically to
the rural context.
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Chapter III lays out the rationale for this thesis. The limitations of current research
regarding duty, conscience and conscientious objection, and moral distress within the
rural context are identified.
Chapter IV outlines the specific application of the method of reflective equilibrium
within this thesis and considers critiques of reflective equilibrium as they relate to this
application.
Chapter V explicates the criteria used to assess the quality of this thesis.
Chapter VI details the three principles reached through reflective equilibrium and an
analysis of the considered moral judgements and competing background theories as they
relate to those principles. This chapter also provides a brief recommendation for
addressing conscientious objection in the rural context and a discussion of the
conclusions, strengths and limitations, and future research suggested by this thesis.

1.3 Biases and motivations
My interest in rural health ethics and conscientious objection began during my
undergraduate degree in Health Science in which I had the opportunity to meet several
rural HCPs and discuss some of the challenges they face in practice settings. I became
interested in the challenges faced by doctors in regard to religious belief conflicts in rural
health care settings. Post-graduation, this interest was sharpened as I began working with
individuals who have various disabilities. I was challenged by the requirement of the
position to balance the needs of the individual, the constraints of the funding agencies,
and the requirement for measurable results to ensure future funding to meet the needs of
the individual. For me this highlighted the challenge faced by an individual who is forced
to act against his or her beliefs, or forced to choose between conflicting values of equal
weight.
I am not a health care professional, and so I come to this research as a relative outsider
within the world of health care. This increases my opportunity to see the issues with a
fresh perspective, but also limits my personal understanding of the challenges faced by
HCPs in the field.
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I approach this research with the assumption that each person brings his or her own
values to any given situation, and that those values cannot be simply laid aside or picked
up at will. I use value, belief, or conviction to mean a firm position or opinion held to be
true by the bearer, which affects his or her actions consistently in similar situations in all
areas of his or her life. Although the terms do have distinct meanings, in the literature
they tend to be used interchangeably; in order to remain consistent between the various
authors, I will continue this practice except when explicitly indicated otherwise.
Furthermore, I hold that values can meaningfully improve patient care when they are
understood and respected by others, and that there is a knowable good and bad, or better
and worse, way to address most situations. However, I acknowledge that a person's
understanding of what is a good or bad approach entails varies with experience and
personal history.
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Chapter 2

2

Literature Review

To consider the question of how to address conscientious objection of a nurse or
physician in a rural setting, when that objection is based on a centrally held value or
belief, a survey of the relevant literature was conducted. For the purpose of this thesis,
nurse refers both to nurses and nurse practitioners, as nurse practitioners in Canada are
registered nurses who have additional training (Health Canada, 2006). Useful article
indexes were identified within philosophy, health sciences, social sciences, law, life
sciences, physical sciences, medicine and dentistry, and education using The University
of Western Ontario’s subject specific resources (2008). The University of Western
Ontario and The London Public Library Catalogues were searched, and a query of the
following databases was done: Journal Storage (JSTOR), The Religion and Philosophy
Collection, PubMed, Project Muse, Allied and Complementary Medicine (AMED),
Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health Literature (CINAHL), EMBASE,
ProQuest, SocIndex, and SCOPUS. The following search terms, and their various
versions, were included in the search: profession, professional, physician, doctor,
practitioner, health professional, and nurse; obligation and duty; value, moral, belief,
ethics, bioethics, intuition, and conscience; conflict, conscientious objection, challenge,
difficulty, motivation, refusal, and conscientious commitment; moral distress, moral
residue, and compassion fatigue; attraction, retention, and recruitment; medical ethics,
nursing ethics, ethics education, moral education, and ethics curriculum; medicine, health
care, rural, remote, and country; and reflective equilibrium and moral epistemology. The
results were restricted to those available in full-text, English, and published in 2000 or
later, which marked the research body that followed the outbreak of SARS, but also
includes some of the discussion immediately preceding that outbreak. Some exceptions
were made for earlier works where the paper is considered foundational or where there is
minimal available literature. Clinical trials were eliminated by reading through the titles,
and all other abstracts were considered for applicability. The remaining applicable
papers were accessed and considered in full, and references were examined for other
relevant resources. Finally, a specific search of the Canadian Journal of Rural Medicine,
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the Rural and Small Town Canada Bulletins, the Canadian Nurses Association, the
Canadian Medical Association, and the Rural Health Initiative was sourced to identify
other relevant resources. These sources were used to synthesize this work.
While the focus of this thesis remains on Canadian Health Care and Conscientious
Objection, the majority of published literature (especially earlier publications) tends to be
limited to discussions of the United States of America or North America as a whole.
Effort is made to provide a clear understanding of the topic discussed using this available
literature. When possible parallels are drawn to show how the discussion may relate to
Canada.
This chapter will consider duty as it relates to the HCP and to the patient, conscientious
objection in health care, a definition of conscience as it will be used in this thesis, a
discussion of moral distress and moral residue and how they relate to conscientious
objection. The use of rural in this thesis is defined and a discussion of its implications for
the preceding topics follows using a determinants of health approach. The chapter ends
with a discussion of the available resources in the rural health care environment.

2.1 Duty
In general, duty is the obligation to do something, or not to do something, for an
individual, family, group, population, or community either directly or indirectly. The
former is a positive duty, a duty to do something; the latter a negative duty, a duty to
abstain from something (Alexander & Moore, 2007). Duties can apply universally, to all
people, or specifically, only to specific groups (e.g. professional or religious groups) or
individuals. Furthermore, one can separate duty, things one should do or not do, from
supererogatory ideals, things that are applaudable but not required by duty or obligation.

2.1.1

Duty in medicine and health care

In medicine and health care the duties or obligations of HCPs are set out explicitly by a
profession’s regulating body, which often derives from the body that advocates nationally
and provincially for that profession. In addition, duties for a specific profession may
derive from a combination of legal precedents, societal expectations, the individual’s
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personal beliefs, and contractual agreements—between the profession or professional and
his or her employer or clients. For example, a nurse may have a duty to put his or her
patients’ interests ahead of his or her own. That duty may arise from the expectations
outlined by his or her regulatory body, legal rulings imposing punishment for nurses who
fail to care, from the contract with his or her employer, and from the societal expectations
that nurses will meet specific professional standards when providing patient care.

2.1.2

Duty in society and the community

All people have duties that derive from their roles as members of a family, a community,
and society in general. For professionals, these duties may either compete with or
augment the duties imposed by their profession. For example, during the outbreaks of
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, many HCPs faced treating an
infectious disease of unknown virulence and fatality, and struggled to determine which
duty took priority: the duty to protect their family members (especially small children and
immune-compromised adults), or the duty to treat their sick patients (Sokol, 2003).

2.1.3

Duty as a health care professional

HCPs have additional, profession-specific, duties that do not apply to most individuals,
due to their specialized knowledge and expertise in health and health care provision, their
assumption of risk in selecting their profession, and their social contract obligating them
to provide care in emergencies when practicing in countries with socialized medicine
systems, such as Canada (Ruderman, Tracy, Bensimon, Bernstein et al. 2006). The
justification for this reasoning is explored extensively, and the aforementioned reasons
(for having additional profession specific duties) accepted, within the literature
addressing Duty to Care within infectious disease outbreaks (Thompson, Faith, Gibson,
& Upshur, 2006; University of Toronto Joint Centre for Bioethics Pandemic Influenza
Working Group, 2005). While some scholars offer guidelines or suggestions to health
care scholars for beginning the process of developing a list of specific duties for nurses
and doctors to adhere to (Godkin & Markwell, 2003; Sokol, 2006), few authors do more
than call for an explicit list of these duties, or discussion among HCPs and the public in
order to derive a list. Several authors try to define specific values that might guide the

8

creation of such lists; however, despite discussion of similar ethical issues very little
overlap between the values espoused seems to exist. These values include compassion
(Canadian Medical Association, 2004), beneficence (Canadian Medical Association,
2004; deMoulpied, 2001), non-maleficence (Canadian Medical Association, 2004;
deMoulpied, 2001), respect for human worth or dignity (Canadian Medical Association,
2004; Illingworth & Parmet, 2006), trustworthiness (Illingworth & Parmet, 2006), justice
(Canadian Medical Association, 2004), accountability (Canadian Medical Association,
2004), moral integrity (Wicclair, 2000), and professionalism (Illingworth & Parmet,
2006). The lack of explicit consideration within these texts is concerning, as “values
serve as the criteria for judgment, preference, and choice” in moral dilemmas (Cook &
Hoas, 2000 p.335). Without some consensus it is easy to understand the lack of an
explicit set of duties that doctors and nurses are expected to use to guide difficult decision
making in practice.
Specific duties for HCPs fall into a few main categories: duties to the patient or client,
duties to society or the community, and special duties during emergencies and within the
role of fiduciaries. The provincial regulatory bodies for nursing and medicine generally
adopt the ethical guidelines outlined by the national nursing and medical associations,
either explicitly or through minor rewording. For this reason common themes originating
in these policies, but mentioned by the regulating bodies, are cited as the national
association’s originating document. When items are only adopted by specific bodies this
is noted. These guidelines make allowances for nurses and doctors to object to providing
care, with the understanding that reasonable alternative care arrangements will be made
where possible or when reasonable notice that care will be terminated is given either to
the client or the employer (Canadian Medical Association, 2004; Canadian Nurses
Association, 2008a). However, most professional associations or regulatory bodies do not
explicitly outline what counts as reasonable notice or grounds. One exception is the
College of Registered Nurses of British Columbia (2008), which specifies that objections
to a client or his or her lifestyle do not qualify as reasonable grounds.
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2.1.3.1

Duty to the patient

Both nurses and doctors have specific duties to their patients within their professional
roles. Both have allowances to choose who to refuse as a patient (FIGO Committee for
the Ethical Aspects of Human Reproduction and Women's Health, 2006; Illingworth &
Parmet, 2006), and both the Canadian Nurses’ Association (CNA) (2008a) and the
Canadian Medical Association (CMA) (2004) support this in their policies. However,
these allowances are particularly limited for nurses who for example, may refuse to
provide care in the case of an abortion when he or she holds prolife views, but may not
refuse care in the case of an emergency if no one else can provide care (Canadian Nurses
Association, 2008a). Legally doctors do not have this duty. Although specific Canadian
precedent is not available, this is supported by American case law that supports a doctor’s
legal right to refuse to treat someone in an emergency if a prior patient-doctor
relationship does not exist, even though it resulted in death, due to a similar policy held
by the American Medical Association (2007). It is noteworthy that this may simply be a
legal and not ethical precedent, since the judge called the action morally reprehensible
despite the law, and generally it is expected that those with the ability to help in an
emergency situation have some duty to do so, if helping will not put them in undue
danger (Illingworth & Parmet, 2006).
Once a relationship is established, doctors and nurses are obligated to declare, and for
nurses to explain, personal value conflicts. As well, both professions have duties to
declare conflicts of interest, limit dual relationships, to act in the patient’s best interests
ahead of self-interest, and refer or arrange for transfer of care when the HCP is unable to
provide a service (Adlersberg, 2007; Canadian Medical Association, 2004; Canadian
Nurses Association, 2008a; Capozzi & Rhodes, 2003). Dual relationships in health care
practice occur when an HCP knows a patient outside the health care context. For
example, a physician or nurse who both treats a patient and receives childcare services
for his or her children from that patient engages in a dual relationship. Both nurses and
doctors also carry a duty not to abandon patients or clients (Canadian Medical
Association, 2004; Canadian Nurses Association, 2008a).
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In the case of conscientious objection, some HCPs may explain their objections to the
patient, arrange transfer of care, or simply refer the patient to an alternative HCP.
Disagreement exists regarding which course of action is most appropriate, with a lack of
consensus regarding the degree of explanation required, and whether transferring care is
required in non-emergency situations. For example, physicians may object to providing a
treatment, but may not provide differing characterizations of treatments to sway a
patient's choice (FIGO Committee for the Ethical Aspects of Human Reproduction and
Women's Health, 2006). The predominant view in non-emergency situations
recommends referring patients to another practitioner (American Medical Association,
2007; Cantor & Baum, 2004; Charo, 2005; Curlin et al., 2007; FIGO Committee for the
Ethical Aspects of Human Reproduction and Women's Health, 2006); however, Wicclair
(2000) argues that despite "opting out" the provider must still assist in the transfer of
care, and also recommends a case-by-case evaluation of whether the obligation to transfer
care is fair. May (2001) similarly argues for transfer of care (while cautioning that
unlimited right to conscientiously refuse in favour of transferring care may lead to
discrimination) and argues for an HCP's right not to offer professional services that
conflict with the HCP's own beliefs. May (2001) goes on to demonstrate that
distinguishing between conscience and needs for tolerance of other's beliefs might
resolve many concerns that lead to conscientious refusals and require a transfer of care.
May (2001) focuses on the scope of conscience claims and makes a clear distinction
between the HCPs conceptualization of his or her professional role and what that role
legitimately entails, and the patient's value judgements on quality of life. May provides
the following example to clarify this difference,

A Jehovah's Witness is in need of a surgical procedure without which he
will die. He is only willing to undergo the procedure, however, if he can be
assured that blood products will not be used. In 9 out of 10 cases, the procedure
does not require the use of blood products. However, the surgeon
involved in the case refuses to perform the procedure unless she has the
option of using blood products. The surgeon acknowledges that she could
perform the procedure without the use of blood products (as it normally
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does not require the use of these), but believes the additional risk imposed
by removing the option to use blood products is too great (2001, p. 112).
May (2001) argues that an HCP can object based on type of activity, providing a surgical
procedure that will probably lead to a patient's death, but not based on the patient's
differing evaluation of the desirability of that activity. In the example, the physician is
making a judgement about whether the risks to the patient (death in 1 out of 10 cases
should blood products be required) outweigh the benefits (recovery). May (2001) argues
that unless the physician always objects to this type of surgery, and does not provide it to
any patients, that the surgeon is objecting to the patient's valuation of the activity (surgery
without blood products) and unacceptably imposing the physician's value system on that
patient. This is not an issue of conscience, but an issue of tolerance of differing beliefs.
These prescriptions, while convincingly argued, fall short of the practice reality. Curlin
and colleagues (2007) showed that a large portion of the physicians they sampled would
neither transfer care nor explain their objection. This suggests that current prescriptions
neither meet the needs of the HCPs who object, by providing an acceptable course of
action, nor are those prescriptions being implemented in an effective manner. Thus many
patients may not be provided with the information to which they are entitled and
consequently are unable to make value judgements concerning their quality of life.
These duties create considerable challenges for HCPs who experience a conflict between
duties and personal values or beliefs. Any foreseeable conflict must be declared up front
(to the employer or patient depending on the situation), and conflicts that are not in the
patient’s ‘best interests’ might serve as sufficiently weighty to overrule the HCPs
objection. As will be discussed further in Section 2.5, transferring care and avoiding dual
relationships presents a special challenge for rural practitioners in small communities,
where there are limited alternative providers and community members often know each
other (Rosenthal, 2006; Scharff, 2006).
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2.1.3.2

Special Duties within emergencies and as fiduciaries

Certain duties only apply in specific circumstances or to specific individuals. First, in
situations of imminent harm, physicians and nurses must set aside any objections, based
on values or beliefs, and provide treatment if no other qualified HCP is available
(Canadian Medical Association, 2004; Canadian Nurses Association, 2008a). There may
be a legal exception to this in cases where no previous patient-doctor relationship exists
for doctors noted by Illingworth and Parmet (2006). This is discouraged by public policy,
and generally, doctors are considered to have a moral duty to provide reasonable
treatment in an emergency, regardless of relationship to the individual requiring care
(Capozzi & Rhodes, 2003; Strom-Gottfried, 2007; Wicclair, 2000). Secondly, as
fiduciaries, HCPs have the duty not to abandon patients (Canadian Medical Association,
2004; Canadian Nurses Association, 2008a). These specific injunctions to provide care in
emergencies, regardless of conscientious position, and not to abandon patients, are
particularly salient to the discussion of how the conscientious objection of an HCP in a
rural setting should be addressed, when that objection is based on a centrally held value
or belief. The first duty eliminates the ability for the HCP to object (as limited alternative
providers mean the HCP will have to set aside their values and beliefs more often than
urban counterparts in order to provide care), while the second presents challenges for
providers who do not have access to alternative HCPs to whom they can transfer their
patients.

2.1.3.3

Duty to society

Compared with scholarly discussion on an HCP's duty to patients, there is little consensus
among scholars regarding the duties of an HCP to society. Most commonly mentioned
duties include protection of the well-being of society, refusal to support practices that
violate human rights, devotion to improving health care, and (for nurses) promotion of
justice and accountability (Canadian Medical Association, 2004; Canadian Nurses
Association, 2008a). Gold (2010) suggests that HCPs also have a duty to stay alive
during emergencies (war or pandemic) in order to provide ongoing care after the crisis is
averted.
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2.1.4

Duty as a patient or member of society

In addition to the duties of HCPs to the patient, several authors also raise the issue of a
patient’s duties to his or her HCP (Gold, 2010; Sokol, 2006) or patient's duty to recognize
his or her physicians' rights and responsibilities that supersede a patient's right to
treatment (Pahlman & Gylling, 2010). Since the informed consent revolution,
paternalistic practice has lost favour and medical ethics has tended to view the patient’s
choices as good, simply because those choices are made by the patient (Draper & Sorell,
2002; Gold, 2010; Sokol, 2006). However, the issues of limited resources and infectious
diseases have recently caused some authors to question the generally held, but unspoken,
view that “patients never make, or cannot make, bad decisions” (Draper & Sorell, 2002,
p.338). Various authors have questioned this view of patients’ requests as good simply by
virtue of them originating from the patient, (Draper & Sorell, 2002; Sokol, 2006) and
have begun to suggest the current consumer model of healthcare considerably limits
practice of ethical medicine and health care in favour of a legal and technical model
(Benner, 1991; Gold, 2010). Specifically, the view of the one-way interaction, in which
the patient is passive, and HCPs have all the power, and thus all of the responsibility for
health care decisions and delivery, has received considerable criticism as a holdover from
the paternalist era (Gold, 2010). Some have even suggested that part of a patient’s duty is
“not to require doctors to transcend the bounds of reasonable risk during treatment and to
respect and acknowledge their [the doctors’] roles outside the realm of medicine” (Sokol,
2006, p.1239). These authors refer to patients’ need to recognize the competing duties
HCPs face: duties to their other patients, their families, their communities, and their
physical health imbued by both the HCP's status as human beings, citizens, and
individuals with a responsibility to society as a whole (Gold, 2010; Sokol, 2006). It is
conceivable that a hitherto unconsidered competing duty is the duty doctors and nurses
have to themselves as moral and spiritual individuals in addition to the explicated duties.
Especially if causing harm to an HCP's conscience prevents the HCP from providing that
necessary level of care to patients after the emergency. Potentially patients also have a
duty to recognize and respect those aspects of their HCPs.
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2.2 Conscientious objection
Conscientious objection in general refers to a refusal of duty. Initial discussion regarding
conscientious objection within ethical literature concerns individuals whose personal
beliefs prevent them from participating in war. These Conscientious Objectors refuse
conscription, and are exempt from the requirement to serve their country in the armed
forces. Some of the reasons given for this allowance included the general laudability of
the beliefs (e.g. killing is wrong, therefore I will not kill even in war), the understanding
that many would go to prison rather than transgress their beliefs, and often these beliefs
do not affect those outside the individual or community (Childress, 1979). These
discussions progressed to include medical personal and their role in war; whether or not
doctors might be required to further the war efforts through use of their expertise in areas
such as chemical warfare and torture, as an example (Rubenstein, 2004).

2.2.1

Conscientious objection in medicine and health care

Over time, the scope of the discussion surrounding conscientious objection expanded
outside the scope of war. In 1973 the ruling of Roe vs. Wade (Wicclair, 2000) marked the
first statutory recognition of medical conscientious objection in the United States of
America. The 'abortion wars' brought conscientious objection to the public's attention,
and left 45 states with 'conscience clauses' (Charo, 2005). Years later the increased use
of emergency contraceptives brought conscientious objection back into popular discourse
as pharmacists refused to dispense medications, in some cases at penalty of their
positions (Cantor & Baum, 2004). Recently, technological advances in life prolongation,
legalization of physician assisted-suicide in some parts of North America (e.g., Oregon)
and ongoing debate regarding the practice in Canada (specifically in British Columbia
and Quebec), and embryonic stem cell research worldwide, has renewed interest in
conscientious objection within medicine (Dimmitt & Artnak, 1994; May, 2001; StromGottfried, 2007; Wilton, 2013).
Interest in the specific role HCPs may play in dictating health care delivery resurfaced in
2003 and again 2007. First, the outbreak of SARS (especially in Toronto, Ontario)
spurred some ethicists to question the limits of HCPs duties to provide care in
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emergencies (Sokol, 2006). Subsequently, the release of a study considering how HCPs
view and react to situations in which they have a value conflict with generally available
treatment options, spurred heated debate (Curlin et al., 2007). Recently, the ongoing
threat of a global pandemic flu outbreak has added to the discussion in the literature
including research into anticipated HCP responses to these situations (Shabanowitz &
Reardon, 2009). Those findings motivated the publication of various articles and books
addressing the topic, and interest continued to expand in the literature. While this is a
concise overview of the history of conscientious objection, it indicates the ongoing
interest in health care related conscientious objection, and its applicability to current
discussions on health care delivery.

2.2.1.1

Definition of conscientious objection used

For the purposes of the following discussion, conscientious objection will specifically
refer to the refusal to follow a specified course of action requested by a patient or
expected by general practice guidelines on the basis of a conflict with personal values,
beliefs, or morals. It is worthwhile to note that conscientious objection is recognized
within the literature under several synonyms including, conscientious refusal (Wicclair,
2011), and conscientious commitment. Conscientious refusal entails refusing an action
for moral reasons (Wicclair, 2011), while conscientious commitment entails insisting on
an action for moral reasons (Dickens, 2008); conscientious commitment is strictly not
synonymous with conscientious objection, but may be a sub-category of objection.
Examples include the insistence on delivering care according to health professional duties
to the patient, instead of according to legal policies and guidelines (Dickens, 2008).

2.2.1.2

Conscientious objection of physicians and nurses

In Canada, primary health care is provided directly by general medical practitioners,
family physicians, nurses, nurse practitioners, pharmacists, social workers, telephone
advice lines, and various allied health professionals (Canadian Institute for Health
Information, 2013b; Health Canada, 2012 August). These services include "prevention
and treatment of common diseases and injuries, basic emergency services... palliative and
end-of-life care... primary maternity care" (Health Canada, 2012 August) and
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psychosocial services (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2013b). Acute inpatient
hospital care and emergency hospital care provide treatment for severe illness over short
time periods (Canadian Institute for Health Information, 2013a). In rural communities,
limited numbers of practitioners mean that acute care in situations of severe illness must
be provided by primary health care practitioners, and any speciality practitioners, often
associated with the hospitals, who are available (Nagarajan, 2004). Because nurses and
physicians, especially in rural areas, provide the majority of emergency care, they are
most likely to be placed in situations where conscientious objection may lead to
imminent harm or death for the patient. For this reason, the focus in this thesis is
specifically on the conscientious objection of physicians and nurses. As previously noted,
the current policies in place to assist HCPs who experience conflicts between their
profession’s duties and other values or duties, involve the transfer of care or reasonable
notice that care will be terminated. These policies do not address the problem of
conscientious objection in cases where there is an urgent need for care without the ability
to transfer the patient to another provider. The tangential research considering refusing to
care during pandemic outbreaks may help inform this discussion as it considers a limited
number of HCPs and patients who may be under quarantine (Shabanowitz & Reardon,
2009; Sokol, 2006). The current standard for conscientious objection in a life-threatening
situation without the ability to transfer care requires nurses and doctors to lay aside
personal conflicts and provide care (Canadian Medical Association, 2004; Canadian
Nurses Association, 2008a). In such a situation, when patient transfer to another provider
or an urban center (in the case of smaller rural communities) is not possible, a
conscientious objection carries a sufficiently negative consequence (death) that it is
reasonable to assume that some people would conclude objecting is morally
reprehensible.
Although the literature considers ethical conflict for pharmacists, psychologists, and
psychiatrists within the rural context (Brownlee, 1996; Cook & Hoas, 2006; Coyle, 1999;
Knapp, Gottlieb, Berman, & Handelsman, 2007; Simon & Williams, 1999), these
professions are excluded because of the existing discussion and the lack of an emergency
or life-threatening aspect to the majority of those issues. Other allied health professionals,
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such as Occupational Therapists, and Physical Therapists, are also excluded for the nonlife-threatening nature of their typical practice.

2.3 Conscience
The following section will discuss conscience specifically. The research and discussion in
this section motivated the publication of the following article: Morton, N. T., &
Kirkwood, K. W. (2009). Conscience and conscientious objection of health care
professionals refocusing the issue. HEC Forum, 21(4), 351-364. The article is
reproduced in part below. The final publication is available at www.springerlink.com.
While conscientious objection is the focus of this project, any discussion on the topic
requires a clear understanding of what is meant by the term ‘conscience’. In the past, the
topic of conscience has raised considerable disagreement as scholars have debated its
existence, function, and purpose. Bernard Wand succinctly conveyed this plurality of
conceptions of conscience (1961).
It has been said of conscience that it is fallible (Broad), that it is infallible (Butler);
that its ultimate basis is emotional (Mill), that its ultimate source is rational
(Rashdall); that it is the voice of God (Hartmann), or the voice of custom (Paulsen);
that it is merely advisory (Nowell-Smith), that it is a command internally imposed
(Mayo); that it is conscious (Butler), that it is unconscious (Freud); that it is a
faculty (Butler), that it is not (any contemporary moral philosopher); that it is the
disposition to have certain beliefs, emotions, and conations1 which, when operative,
issue in conscientious actions (Broad), and that it is conscientious action (Ryle). (p.
771).
Wand's statement clearly shows the extensive and contradicting opinions that exist
concerning conscience. Conscience regained the attention of scholars after the
publication of a study in the New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) that surveyed

1

“an inclination (as an instinct, a drive, a wish, or a craving) to act purposefully” (Encyclopedia Britannica,
2008)
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American doctors and the role of conscience in medical practice. The results revealed that
although 63 percent of physicians claimed that it was appropriate to express and explain
moral objections to patients, fourteen percent did not feel obligated to disclose
information, and 29 percent did not feel the need to refer patients “for morally
contentious medical procedures” (Curlin et al., 2007, p.593). Publication of the study was
followed by heated debate about the role of conscience in the practice of medicine, and
the status of an HCP's right to refuse to treat based on conscience. This fervour prompted
the American Journal of Bioethics (AJOB) to publish an issue focusing on conscience
and its application to conscientious objection in December 2007, and that was followed
by various other publications both in the form of books and articles that continued to fuel
the debate. The issue published by AJOB featured the varied and conflicting positions of
many prominent authors on conscience (Adams, 2007; Barfield, 2007; Cook, 2007;
Emerson & Daar, 2007; Glenn & Boyce, 2007; Ladd, 2007; LaFollette, 2007; Lawrence
& Curlin, 2007; Night, 2007; Orr, 2007; Savulescu, 2007; Wicclair, 2007). Given the vast
and disparate literature on conscience, I will confine my consideration to the positions
articulated by these key authors and other publications addressing these positions on the
topic since that time. These publications are useful as they focus specifically on
conscience as it applies to health care and medicine. As well, they provide a range of
perspectives including religious and secular views, and various positions on the
appropriate status of conscience in health care decisions. The following definition derives
from the assertions about conscience that appear in that body of literature.
In this thesis, conscience is the mental process that strives to maintain an individual's
authenticity and integrity by alerting the individual to potential violations of his or her
values; and acts on those violations by persistent badgering or harassing of the person
until the violations (both general and specific) are remedied or the person becomes
desensitized to the warnings (Morton & Kirkwood, 2009). ‘Remedies’ encompasses both
the option for the conscience to grow through experience or education, changing the
value or application of the value that caused the conflict, and the potential to reverse the
contravening action or make amends for it (Morton & Kirkwood, 2009).
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2.3.1

Conscience in medicine and health care

This discussion focuses specifically on conscience in light of its value in directing ethical
decision making within the health care context. I will first address the fallacy that there
exists a ‘religious’ conscience, before considering the major challenges to accepting
‘conscience’ as an essential element in ethical health care delivery.

2.3.1.1

The religious vs. secular conscience fallacy

Given the presented definition, it intuitively follows that the conscience functions
similarly for every individual. Thus, only the content of the conscience, the moral laws or
values of the individual, and how that content is obtained differs from person to person. It
also follows that there is no difference in the mechanism of the conscience between
individuals, and it is pointless to refer to a 'religious' or 'secular' conscience mechanism as
put forward by some authors (Lawrence & Curlin, 2007). Since the conscience is unique
only in content and application of that content, not its function or effect on each person, it
is the content of the conscience that is religiously or secularly informed. Although this
difference seems minor, it is significant, because the effect of a contravention of a
centrally held value is expected to affect an individual equally regardless of the source of
that value. As such, “it is the place or role of the belief in the life of the individual, not its
source or foundation that is decisive” (Wicclair, 2007, p. 31) in determining how the
belief should be addressed.

2.3.1.2

Challenges to conscience and conscientious objection

The following discussion considers whether arguments given for ignoring or superseding
conscience claims in health care and medicine apply in this context. There are a few
major arguments for why objections due to conflicts with conscience among HCPs
should not be honoured. The majority of these revolve around patient welfare and the
potential for patient harm when HCP’s, especially physicians', consciences are allowed to
take a role in how they deliver medical care. Several authors articulate this to varying
degrees (Curlin et al., 2007; May, 1983; Savulescu, 2007). For the authors who highlight
this as an issue, the main concerns are the difficulty of separating genuine conscience
claims and objections from prejudice and discrimination, delayed access to care, and
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inefficiencies introduced by needing to move patients about from provider to provider. A
final objection concerns the voluntary acceptance, by the HCP, of the duties of his or her
profession, and the professional's ethical obligation to meet requirements that he or she
accepted in choosing his or her career.
The first major challenge to respecting conscience involves distinguishing between
claims that are truly based on conscientious beliefs and those that are prejudiced or
discriminatory. Note that the definition presented states that conscience grows and
changes with education and experience. This implies that the individual who refuses to
re-evaluate or modify aspects of his or her moral code when presented with evidence that
his or her value is based on erroneous information does not act on conscience but instead
on something similar to superstition or discrimination. This distinction may be made
provided the presented evidence is consistent with the individual's method of reasoning
and beliefs. Here, superstition is an irrational belief held in the face of disproving
evidence, presented in accordance and consistent with a particular individual's way of
acquiring knowledge. In addition, LaFollette and LaFollette (2007) address this issue of
distinguishing a legitimate claim to conscience from a fallacious or erroneous one. Key
points in their consideration are how central the value is, how plausible the justification is
(that the justification does not simply repeat another person's views), and how willing the
individual is to respect others’ rights to object. They also consider the voluntary choice
to join a profession as a reason to consider overriding a claim to conscience in favour of a
more significant claim, which will be addressed later. Finally, it is worth noting that the
difficulty in differentiating between the three categories, actual appeals to conscience,
prejudices, and discriminations, does not relieve us of any ethical responsibilities that a
true appeal to conscience may place on us. Although it means application of the ethical
action may be difficult, the normative ethical implications do not change. As such,
although this objection offers a challenge, it does not waive any responsibility for
addressing the implications of conscientious objections.
Similarly to the discrimination challenge, the second and third criticisms of respecting
conscientious objection reflect administrative issues, and do not impact the ethical
implications created by a true appeal to conscience, except when combined with another
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obligation—for example a duty to prevent delays in access to care, or to maximize the
efficiency of the health system. As such, the fourth objection presents the most weighty
reason that one might override a claim to conscience in support of patient welfare, and
may carry sufficient weight when combined with the first three concerns to reconsider
them as ethical impediments to honouring the HCP's conscience, despite the benefits of
doing so. In this argument, the conscientious objector voluntarily agrees to accept the
commitments and duties of his or her profession. Therefore, it is the objector who was
ethically obligated to determine if he or she could meet the requirements of the profession
before practicing, and should his or her position change, to leave the profession
(Savulescu, 2007). However, for this to hold true it must be feasible for an individual to
predict potential conflicts and avoid placing him or herself into those situations.
According to this view, a professional entering a field should determine his or her ability
to adhere to the field's requirements prior to accepting those obligations; because, the
individual voluntarily enters the field and there are specific requirements expected of
professionals in this field (LaFollette & LaFollette, 2007). However, this requirement is
not necessarily realistic. Since the conscience mechanism grows and changes as it gains
experience, a person entering an undergraduate nursing program at seventeen or eighteen
years old, or a medical school as early as twenty years old, will not necessarily possess
sufficient experience to have a fully developed conscience, nor would he or she
necessarily be aware of where conflicts between his or her beliefs may arise with the
profession's requirements. One goal of health professional training is to develop the
consciences of future HCPs (Cook, 2007; Goldie, 2004; Shelton, 1999). So, at the time of
entry into the program, it is not always possible to predict what objections a person might
develop or lose over time with experience and education. As such, requiring students to
anticipate potential conflicts prior to enrolment is impractical; new objections are likely
to be created or old ones eliminated by the education itself.
The next feasible point for this decision might be at certification after the HCP's training.
Potentially, individuals could determine their ability to meet the requirements of the
profession prior to accreditation. However, while the recent nursing or medical graduate
has some clinical experience to refine his or her conscience, I would posit that much
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learning and development occurs once an HCP begins working consistently within his or
her field. Since the conscience develops through experiences that force resolution of
value conflicts, it is reasonable to expect that ideals developed in formal education would
be refined in the workplace. Only through the experience of practicing and confronting
conflicts can a practitioner discover which personal values conflict with his or her
professional duties, and determine whether those conflicts are the result of erroneous
beliefs or not. Therefore, as he or she acquires experience, the recent graduate’s beliefs
may change drastically through the refining and educating process of experience. For that
reason, while a recent graduate may be able to identify some potential conflicts that may
arise, it is probable that even those values will be modified and revised as the new
graduate gains more experience. Furthermore, large changes have continued to occur in
health care practice. New issues are arising surrounding end-of-life care and intensive
interventions each year (Dickens & Cook, 2000; Fielder, 2005; Garcia, 2007); each of
these challenges could cause even expert HCPs to re-evaluate their conscience as they
adapt to changes in the practice environment. As such it may not be possible or
reasonable to expect all graduates to determine their ability to practice within the field,
based on an understanding of their values and the implications those values hold (Cook,
2007). Instead, we need individuals who have the tools to evaluate and respond ethically
to new and difficult ethical dilemmas.
Finally, although some values might be more likely to lead to conflict than others, every
person brings his or her own set of moral values to practice. In a multi-cultural and multifaith society these will eventually conflict with a client or patient, regardless of how
reasonable or benign the value (Shelton, 1999). It is more important that we recognize
this as a feature of being a conscientious member of society, and facilitate the
development of skills for addressing these issues, than that we attempt the impossible feat
of screening out every person with an offending view. Such an extreme policy might
result in very few, if any, people qualifying for practice, or worse, only allow those
individuals without a sensitive conscience to practice (Austin, Lemermeyer, Goldberg,
Bergum, & Johnson, 2005).
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2.4 Moral distress
As with most research on both conscience and conscientious objection, the majority of
literature addressing moral distress, originates from the United States and countries other
than Canada. However, recent research conducted by the Joint Centre for Bioethics at the
University of Toronto suggests the findings from other countries are transferable to
Canada (Bell & Breslin, 2008). Moral distress occurs when an HCP knows what is
ethically and morally required, but is unable to act on that knowledge (Corley, 2002), the
definition originally related specifically to organizational constraints faced by nurses;
however, recent research has removed that stipulation (Kälvemark, Höglund, Hansson,
Westerholm, & Arnetz, 2004). Authors now include “an error of judgment, some
personal failing (for example, a weakness or crimp in one’s character such as a pattern of
‘systemic avoidance’), or other circumstances truly beyond one’s control”, as potential
constraints (Webster & Baylis, 2000, p.218). It is noteworthy that some authors
distinguish between moral distress, recognizing what is ethically required and being
unable to act, and a moral dilemma, a situation in which two or more values conflict and
recommend opposing actions (Kälvemark et al., 2004). In a moral dilemma there is a
feeling of loss regardless of the course of action taken. For this thesis, moral dilemmas
are considered within the umbrella of moral distress, because in both situations the result
is from the inability to meet the dictates of conscience whether in part or in whole.
Ethical stress or distress is generally considered the outcome of moral distress, although
some authors do use the terms interchangeably; it usually refers to the “emotional,
physical and psychosocial consequences of moral distress” (Ulrich, O'Donnell, Taylor,
Farrar et al., 2007, p.1709). Moral distress can be divided into initial and reactive moral
distress. Initial distress includes the feelings of “frustration, anger, and anxiety” when
faced with the initial conflict between perceived duty and ability to act (Corley, 2002,
p.637). Reactive distress is felt when an individual does not act on his or her initial
distress.
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2.4.1

Moral distress in health care professionals

The literature on moral distress focuses on nurses and the challenges inherent in fulfilling
their commitments while functioning as part of a hierarchical HCP team (Hamric &
Blackhall, 2007; Ulrich et al., 2007). However, recent cross-discipline research has
confirmed moral distress as an issue experienced by all HCPs (Kälvemark et al., 2004;
Oberle & Hughes, 2008).
Evidence suggests nurses experience moral distress more often than doctors (Hamric &
Blackhall, 2007), and research suggests factors that increase or ease this burden. Corley
(2002) notes the main issues increasing moral distress are
“harm to patients in the form of pain and suffering, the treatment of patients as
objects when meeting institutional requirements, health policy constraints, medical
prolongation of dying without letting the patient or the family know about choices
concerning care, the definition of brain death, inadequate staffing, and the effects of
cost containment” (p.639).
Generally environments that fostered discussions about treatment decisions tend to
mitigate the impact of moral distress on the HCPs (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007; Ulrich et
al., 2007).

2.4.2

Moral residue

The ongoing experience of distress leads to moral residue, “that which each of us carries
with us from those times in our lives when in the face of moral distress we have seriously
compromised ourselves or allowed ourselves to be compromised” (Webster & Baylis,
2000, p.218). Moral residue is normally linked with threats to or betrayal of core beliefs
or values (MacPhail, 2003). As such, moral residue can be considered an outcome of a
failure or inability to conscientiously object in the face of a conflict with a core value or
belief.

25

2.4.2.1

Consequences of moral residue

Unaddressed, whether due to real or perceived failure to act, moral residue can increase
financial burden and decrease quality of patient care within health care delivery (Blough,
2006; Mark & Stanton, 2004). Research shows that between 25% and 45% of nurses and
3% of physicians have either considered leaving or have left a position or the profession
due to ongoing causes of moral distress and moral residue (Bell & Breslin, 2008; Hamric
& Blackhall, 2007; Ulrich et al., 2007). As pointed out by Austin and colleagues (2005)
this may be a grievous loss as those most affected by moral distress at the bedside and the
most likely to leave, are also those most sensitive to patient issues and make the best
patient advocates. Even in situations where HCPs do not leave their employment, moral
distress has been significantly correlated to emotional exhaustion (Meltzer & Huckabay,
2004), which supports other findings that moral distress leads to poorer care delivery.
Emotional exhaustion is a key component of compassion fatigue (Leon, Altholz, &
Dziegieleqski, 1999). Compassion fatigue, also known as secondary traumatic stress
disorder, affects those emotionally affected by the trauma of another (Leon et al., 1999;
Robins, Meltzer, & Zelikovsky, 2009). Compassion fatigue includes "decreased concern
for clients," decreased empathy, "physical and emotional exhaustion," increased job
dissatisfaction, and hopelessness regarding work which affects other areas of an
individual's life (Leon et al., 1999). Compassion fatigue carries many similarities to
moral distress. Similarly burn out, which is identified by emotional exhaustion, reduced
personal accomplishment and depersonalization, is linked to a stressed conscience
(Juthberg, Eriksson, Norberg, & Sundin, 2008). Burn out has further been shown to result
in a deadened conscience, which results in decreased commitment and decreased care for
patients (Juthberg et al., 2008). Burn out, moral distress, and compassion fatigue show
very similar risk factors and outcomes which suggests that they are linked (Juthberg et
al., 2008; Leon et al., 1999). Most studies note the challenge of stimulating responses
from HCPs who are burned out or emotionally exhausted. Rather than discrediting the
findings that link challenges to conscience with moral distress, burn out and compassion
fatigue, this limitation suggests that the extent of the problem may be still greater than
research has found (Bell & Breslin, 2008). The cost moral residue presents to the health
care system appears to be quite high. Bell and Breslin (2008) estimate a cost of $60 000
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just to replace and train a new specialty nurse, without including the impact on staff
morale and patient care.
Some authors argue that some experience of moral residue and moral distress maybe
beneficial to HCPs. Experiencing moral residue can clarify core values, competing
commitments, and duties that an HCP may have. Similarly to conflicts with conscience
which provide an opportunity for individuals to further develop their understanding of
their personal values and conscience, these experiences of moral residue may also allow
HCPs to determine when conflicts are personal and do not require action, or when they
are communal or institutional and require advocacy on the part of the HCP (Webster &
Baylis, 2000).
For example, in the recent Golubchuk case in Canada, an elderly man was admitted to
hospital with pneumonia, pulmonary hypertension, and a pre-existing brain injury from
four years prior. He had poor heart and kidney function and was admitted to the ICU one
month later. Physicians recommended Mr. Golubchuk be removed from life support due
to minimal brain function and little hope for recovery. Physicians claimed that keeping
Mr. Golubchuk on life-support was ‘torture’. The family argued that to hasten his death
by taking him off life support was ‘murder’ according to their beliefs as Orthodox Jews.
During the legal battle that followed three of Mr. Golubchuk’s doctors resigned due to
what might be termed conscientious objection to the patient’s treatment, and Mr.
Golubchuck subsequently died before the trial date set to resolve the concerns between
family and HCPs (Mundle, Dec 10, 2008). A case such as this one, might allow HCPs to
clarify if their objections to continuing life-sustaining treatment in futile cases are based
on personal values that might require transferring the case to another provider, but did not
require advocacy. Or if their objections are based on broader societal and communal
values that required the HCPs to act on behalf of the patient to ensure the ‘right’ course
of action is followed.
However, just as moral residue might lead to some benefit it can also cause harm, leading
to error. Webster and Baylis (2000) argue that moral residue can lead to “denial of the
incoherence between beliefs and actions, trivialization of the incoherence between beliefs
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and actions, or unreflective acceptance of the incoherence between beliefs and actions”
(p.225). Essentially, as noted by authors addressing issues of conscience, failing to
respect or recognize conscientious judgments can decrease future ethical decision making
ability.

2.5 Rural context
Each of the topics reviewed so far, duty, conscientious objection, conscience, and moral
distress, all have specific implications when viewed from a rural health care context. As
such the following section will define and discuss that specific context.

2.5.1

Definition and general concerns

Generally scholars agree that creating a single definition of what it means to be rural is
impossible; consequently, authors need to define clearly how they intend to use 'rural' in
each context (du Plessis, Beshiri, Bollman, & Clemenson, 2001; Rourke, 1997). Rourke
defines rural practice as "practice in nonurban areas, where most medical care is provided
by a small number of general practitioners/family doctors with limited or distant access to
specialist resources and high technology health care facilities" (1997, p. 113). In this
thesis, I define rural as sufficient distance to alternative emergency health care services
to make transport unlikely or impossible, as well as a restricted number of HCPs who can
provide emergency care, meaning that only one or two are generally available at any
given time. I define a sufficient distance to be within one hour of transport (based on
transportation available in the considered area). The one-hour timeframe is based on
evidence suggesting that 30% of deaths occur within minutes to a few hours of injury or
accident. This has given rise to the term "golden hour", because death will occur if
emergency treatment is not received in this timeframe (Yawn, Bushy, & Yawn, 1994). In
addition, I consider the rural environment to lead to an increased scope of practice for the
considered health care professionals, and I recognize that environmental conditions in
Canada may place some areas within this definition of rural only for specific periods of
the year. For the purpose of this thesis, I consider 'remote' within the category of rural,
unless specifically indicated otherwise.

28

2.5.1.1

Challenges defining rural

Definitions of rural fall into two categories, technical or geographical and social-cultural
(Troughton, 1999). Technical or geographical definitions rely on land features or
population statistics for determining ‘rural’ (Pitblado, 2005), while socio-cultural
definitions consider “a community of interest, a culture, and way of life” (du Plessis et
al., 2001, p.4).
Technical or geographical definitions, categorized as descriptive definitions by Halfacree
(1993), rely on population size, density, commuting areas, land features, and land use
statistics (du Plessis et al., 2001; Troughton, 1999). Most commonly cited within the
literature is the non-metropolitan region, an American system adapted by Philip Ehrensaft
and Jennifer Beeman, which focuses on population size and proximity to urban
settlements (du Plessis et al., 2001). These descriptive definitions are heavily criticized
for their reliance on the definitions of the variables, their historical relativism, and for the
lack of qualitative consideration in the data. Ultimately, they are highly specialized and
hard to use as a general measure of rural, and they often rely on picking boundaries that
have little to do with health care issues (Pitblado, 2005).
In contrast, socio-cultural definitions assume that environment affects behaviour. Nelson
and Weeks (2006) imply this when they state that “the rural community is not identified
only by its small population density and distance to an urban setting but also by a
combination of social, religious, geographical, cultural, economic and health-related
factors” (p.411). Other examples include Louis Wirth's ruralism, which characterizes
rural “by stability, integration and rigid stratification, with individuals coming into
contact with the same people in a variety of situations” (Halfacree, 1993, p.25), and the
more recent rural-urban continuum. However, these types of definitions are criticized for
relying on a fallacious urban-rural dichotomy, and for their idealization of rural as the
positive aspects lacking in urban. As a result of the above criticisms some authors hold
that no successful social definition of rural exists (Pitblado, 2005).
Given the failure of these two major categories, Halfacree (1993) proposes using a
combination of the two. A recognition that “when we consider (rural) space, we must not
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only consider the structures producing that space but also the way in which that space is
subsequently used to produce other space” (p.27). The presented definition attempts to
marry these two categories, utilizing the strengths of each.

2.5.2

Context - a picture of rural life

When considering the health of rural communities and rural individuals compared to their
urban counterparts, it becomes clear that rural people already have compromised health
(Leipert, 2006). This difference makes it even more important to consider the
implications of HCP conscientious objection in the rural environment. Using the
determinants of health approach, the following aspects of rural health will be discussed:
Income and social status, social support networks, education and literacy,
employment/working conditions, social environments, physical environments, personal
health practices and coping strategies, healthy child development, health services, gender
and culture (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2003). Biological and genetic endowment
is omitted as this thesis assumes no significant difference between urban and rural
populations in this determinant.

2.5.2.1

Income and social status

Lower income and social status are consistently linked to poorer health outcomes for
Canadians. Specifically, the lack of control over stressful circumstances associated with
lower income and social status seems to correspond with fewer choices and fewer coping
skills for addressing stressful situations. The resulting stress decreases immune and
hormone responses (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2003).
Rural citizens generally have lower income status when compared to urban counterparts
(Singh, 2004). It follows that rural individuals can be expected to have poorer health
outcomes related to their lower income status (DesMeules, Pong, Lagace, Heng et al.,
2006).

30

2.5.2.2

Social support networks

Good social support from family members and friends appears to act as a buffer to
negative health outcomes and seems to mitigate serious health risk factors such as
smoking, high blood pressure, and obesity (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2003).
While rural communities are idealized as having stronger relational ties and better
support networks, vulnerable members of the community may not experience this support
(Leipert & Reutter, 2005). Specifically, for women, who often live in northern and rural
communities because of a spouse’s employment, isolation from family members and
other social support networks can be the reality (Leipert, 2006). This is especially true if
the community member is not accepted by the larger community (Leipert, 2006).

2.5.2.3

Education and literacy

Education helps to equip individuals increasing, their skills and knowledge for problem
solving and coping with stressful events. Education also increases opportunities for
employment and control over an individual's life circumstances, and as a result is closely
tied to socioeconomic status (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2003).
Rural communities typically have lower percentages of individuals with high school
completion or post-secondary education when compared with their urban counterparts
(DesMeules et al., 2006; Rothwell & Turcotte, 2006).

2.5.2.4

Employment and working conditions

Employment and working conditions includes both paid and unpaid work (for example
housework and childcare). Combined these activities affect the mental, physical and
social health of individuals. While unsafe workplaces lead to injuries, a good work
environment helps provide individuals with purpose, identity, and income, as well as a
sense of personal growth and increased social interactions (Public Health Agency of
Canada, 2003 Key Determinant 4).
Rural communities have a lower percentage of skilled workers in the workforce and an
increased number of unskilled positions compared to urban settings (Alasia &
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Magnusson, 2005). In Canada rural communities also have high percentages of
unemployed individuals (DesMeules et al., 2006). A notable exception to this is
mentioned by Beshiri and Bollman (2001b) who found tourism employment is on par
with urban areas. Furthermore, rural occupations tend to be more hazardous as they are
often based in the outdoor environment or with wildlife (Leipert, 2006). Farming
particularly exposes workers to dangers from farm machinery, agricultural chemicals,
long hours, over exertion, environmental issues such as insect, animal and snakebites, and
diseases related to animals and dust (Turner & Gutmanis, 2005). When considered in
conjunction with the previous determinant, the result is a less educated workforce with
greater potential to be injured or killed on the job.

2.5.2.5

Social environment

Community institutions and civic involvement reflect the strength of the social networks
in a community. A greater sense of community membership and trust is associated with
better health outcomes and allows members to share resources (Public Health Agency of
Canada, 2003).
As previously mentioned, rural communities are often idealized as having closely
connected members (Leipert & Reutter, 2005; Leipert, 2006). However, this can create
challenges for individuals trying to flee dangerous situations and seeking assistance for
sensitive issues. Leipert (2005) discusses how an individual who parks his or her car at
the local women's centre is assumed by community members to be going there for help or
counselling. Leipert (2005) also discusses that seeing a counsellor in a small community
comes with the understanding that one might see the same counsellor in a social situation.
In both cases an individual may feel that confidentiality is at stake and fail to seek
assistance (2005).

2.5.2.6

Physical environment

Exposure to contaminants from air, water, food and soil affect an individual's health and
includes considerations such as housing, air quality, and transportation. Adverse effects
can include "cancer, birth defects, respiratory illness and gastrointestinal ailments"
(Public Health Agency of Canada, 2003 Key Determinant 6).
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The geography surrounding rural communities plays a part in the health of rural
populations (Romanow, 2002). Rural and northern communities often face "challenging
terrain, long distances" and "lengthy winters with little sunlight”, these contribute “to
physical and mental health issues" (Leipert, 2006, p. 83) and limits access to social
support and health care resources (DesMeules et al., 2006). Furthermore, travel in the
winter months can be dangerous, expensive, and time consuming (Leipert, 2006). As
previously mentioned, the areas of employment in rural communities are primarily in the
agriculture, fishing, forestry, mining, gas and oil sectors, which carry increased health
risks for workers (Alasia & Magnusson, 2005).

2.5.2.7

Personal health practices and coping skills

Personal health practices and coping skills allow individuals to take control of their
environment, make choices regarding their health and self-care, and help individuals to
cope with life challenges and change (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2003).
The physical environment of rural communities makes travel arduous in the winter
months (DesMeules et al., 2006; Leipert & Reutter, 2005). In addition, agriculture,
fishing, forestry and tourism are typically seasonal occupations (Alasia & Magnusson,
2005; Beshiri & Bollman, 2001b). The combination of difficulty traveling in the winter
months and short window of access to seasonal work can lead individuals to postpone
seeking care for illness and injury until they are too sick to cope rather than taking time
off work to address issues immediately (Leipert & Reutter, 2005; Leipert, 2006). Mitura
and Bollman (2003) note that rural populations are significantly less likely to take action
on their health than their urban equivalents. In addition, individuals in rural communities
have higher percentages of smoking, obesity, arthritis, and depression than urban
counterparts (Mitura & Bollman, 2003). This may mean that patients arriving for
treatment arrive sicker than urban counter parts and are more likely to experience
complications due to poor health practices.

2.5.2.8

Healthy child development

Research suggests that childhood experiences have a profound influence on a person's
later health. Specifically, children and infants who experience abuse or are exposed to
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tobacco and alcohol inutero are at increased risk for poor birth outcomes, health
problems, behavioural issues, and social issues in later life (Federal, Provincial and
Territorial Advisory Committee on Population Health, 1999). In addition, researchers are
becoming more aware of how other determinants such as social environment, physical
environment (e.g. housing), family income, and education affect childhood health, which
can affect healthy outcomes in later adulthood (Curtis, Dooley, & Phillips, 2004; Public
Health Agency of Canada, 2003).
Study findings from Canada and other countries seem to agree that young children,
youth, and teenagers experience both positive and negative health effects growing up in
rural communities. These outcomes include closer social ties and closer bonds between
members, but also challenges in accessing social opportunities (available activities,
choices in friendships, and traveling to visit friends), limitations imposed by conservative
community values and norms (especially surrounding access to sexual health care and
education), and the risk of social exclusion (Eriksson, Asplund, & Sellstrom, 2010;
Shoveller, Johnson, Prkachin, & Patrick, 2007).

2.5.2.9

Health services

Population health is affected by the availability of health services including preventative
care, health promotion, health maintenance, and services providing treatment of illness
and injury (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2003, Key Determinant 10). This includes
services not included in universal health care such as eye care, dentistry, counselling, and
medications (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2003).
Health care delivery in rural areas is impacted by limited access to HCPs (due to a lack of
providers and due to travel distance between providers), increased cost per person of
delivering the service, and a lack of specialists forcing HCPs in rural communities to
become expert generalists (Rosenthal, 2006; Scharff, 2006). For services not covered by
universal health care (such as dental), challenges in access also include a lack of
insurance; because, the types of work available in rural areas often do not provide
insurance benefits that might cover these services (Lui, Probst, Martin, Wang, & Salinas,
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2007). As a result, individuals experience greater barriers to accessing certain health
services than urban individuals.
HCPs face further challenges in communities where dual relationships are a necessity
and where patients may not agree to transfers to urban centers because of a lack of "trust"
that urban HCPs understand or listen to rural patients' concerns, or because it is difficult
for family members to travel with the patient (Capozzi & Rhodes, 2003; Cook, Hoas, &
Guttmannova, 2000; Cook & Hoas, 2000; May, 2001). This perspective may result from
rural health care being seen as more personal and caring, and rural individuals expecting
to be treated by someone who knows them (Scharff, 2006).

2.5.2.10 Gender
Gender includes societal norms, social roles and power relationships, values, attitudes,
and behaviours that influence community actions and health service priorities and
delivery to the different sexes (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2003). It can also affect
how individuals access and experience these services.
Rural communities can both empower and make individuals vulnerable. Various reasons
may contribute to this dichotomy. For example, Little (2002) suggests gendered roles are
perceived by some women as giving them power over their health, their lives, and their
community by creating a space of expertise that is off limits to male community
members. However, other authors have noted that the close community ties and the
traditional roles often expected of women can lead to silence and isolation that prevent
women (and men) from escaping abusive situations, and limit the accessible resources
available to these individuals (Adelson, 2005; Leipert, 2008). As a result, while gender
may lead to more control over health care for some women, many still experience
challenges related to access.

2.5.2.11 Culture
A community's valuation of language and traditions, stigmatization, and marginalization
of specific community members creates and mitigates additional health challenges for
community members (Public Health Agency of Canada, 2003).
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Factors surrounding gender are exacerbated for aboriginal populations (including First
Nations, Inuit, and Métis) whose quality of living and health care access has been
compared to third world conditions (Adelson, 2005; DesMeules et al., 2006). As noted by
Adelson, this means that it is even more important to respect and be sensitive to the
cultural and religious decision making strategies and value systems of these vulnerable
individuals. In Canada, the majority of aboriginal communities are located in northern
and rural areas (DesMeules et al., 2006). Extensive studies have highlighted the
challenges in rural communities of aboriginal individuals who experience poorer health
outcomes than non-aboriginal Canadians (Adelson, 2005; DesMeules et al., 2006). These
include higher rates of "diabetes, heart disease, hypertension, cancer... arthritis," and
smoking; and mortality "due to cancer, motor vehicle accidents, circulatory diseases,
diabetes, alcoholism and suicide" (DesMeules et al., 2006, p.36). In addition, immigrants
and minority groups can experience these challenges depending on the specific
community's approach to those minorities.
As result, it is essential that HCPs in rural areas be both aware of potential biases toward
their patients, as well as be held accountable for their interaction with those patients. This
insures that individuals who are more vulnerable have an advocate in the community, and
that HCPs do not unintentionally allow their biases to perpetuate the conditions that cause
the vulnerability of these individuals. While this is true of HCPs anywhere, the lack of
alternative HCPs in rural communities makes vigilance even more important for rural
HCPs. It is also important that others in the community (not just HCPs) can hold an HCP
who does perpetuate these conditions accountable, and help to mitigate the power
imbalance experienced by the more vulnerable rural individuals.

2.5.3

Rural health care delivery

Rural health care delivery demands flexibility and a willingness to learn and depend on
others. HCPs are required to cross the lines that delineate both their profession and areas
of expertise in order to deliver essential care to their patients often expanding what would
be considered normal areas of practice (Scharff, 2006).
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2.5.3.1

Who is involved?

The delivery of health care services in rural communities depends on each HCP's ability
to work both independently and as the core member of a team, which may include
registered nurses, nurse practitioners, doctors, and/or a variety of other service providers
(Troyer & Lee, 2006).
This thesis focuses on the first three, whose specific roles blur in the rural environment.
Jane Scharff (2006) refers to this blurring as intersections. In this thesis that definition is
expanded: intersections are points at which HCPs meet and interface with other HCPs,
expanding practice into the domains of other professions when needed. Practically, this
plays out with nurses providing essential care that extends their scope of practice, and
doctors providing care that crosses into the nurse’s area of purview, but also that exceeds
his or her training (Rosenthal, 2006; Scharff, 2006).
The scope of practice for rural HCPs generally exceeds that of an urban HCP. While
urban HCPs may only work in one or two specialty areas, Scharff (2006) found that a
rural HCP needs to move between at least three or four specialty areas during any given
shift. He or she must be able to provide surgical support for one patient, treat individuals
in the emergency room, deliver infants, provide palliative care, and provide cardiac care.
This requires that a much broader range of skills be maintained than might be expected of
an urban HCP, often without as much opportunity for the rural HCP to engage in
continuing education and practice opportunities. Interestingly, rural physicians are more
likely to rely on, read notes, and respond to notes from nurses than urban counterparts
(Scharff, 2006); however, this willingness does not eliminate the experience of HCPs
lower in the organizational hierarchy of the community from feeling powerless in the
same manner experienced by urban HCPs (Austin et al., 2005). As reported by Austin
and colleagues (2005) while often discussed as physicians causing nurses to feel
powerless, the source of that powerlessness may not be other HPCs, but may be "hospital
administration and policies" and even the law (p. 36).
In general rural HCPs need a willingness to learn; a love for being a “jack-of-all-trades;”
have knowledge of their limitations; ability to use common sense when determining
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which rules to break; and flexibility (Rosenthal, 2006; Scharff, 2006; Troyer & Lee,
2006). Often HCPs within a community will “specialize” in a specific area, but are
expected to maintain competence and comfort working in all other areas. For example,
Doctor A and Nurse A may have developed specific expertise in cardiac care and
obstetrics through additional study and practice, while Doctor B and Nurse B have
developed additional expertise in emergency care, and cancer care. All HCPs would still
be expected to be capable of providing surgical support and care, and all of the above
would be expected to move competently and comfortably between each area often within
a single shift, with an understanding that specific individuals are more skilled in
particular areas.

2.5.3.2

Challenges

Within rural health care delivery, HCPs and communities face two main challenges:
retaining and recruiting HCPs to provide necessary services, and providing or acquiring
the necessary resources (medical, technological, educational, and ethical) to provide
those services. However, despite these challenges, rural communities carry the potential
to be able to respond more quickly to changing professional dynamics that require greater
inter-professional communication and co-operation due to their smaller size and
increased levels of communication between HCPs compared to urban counterparts
(Scharff, 2006).

2.5.3.2.1

Recruitment and retention

Recruitment and retention of HCPs poses a significant challenge to rural centres. Lori
Hendrickx (2006) notes that pay differences and barriers to continuing education pose
added challenges to recruiting and retaining professionals in rural areas.
In Canada, and specifically in Ontario, several programs have been introduced to address
this issue such as providing financial incentives during formal education, during practice,
or after practicing for a specified period of time in a rural setting (Ministry of Health and
Long-Term Care, 2009a; Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2009b; Ontario
Medical Association, 2002). In addition, the Rural and Northern Physician Groups
agreement (RNPGA) attempted to address concerns about continuing education, locum
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relief, stable remuneration and isolation by providing block funding for groups of
physicians (Society for Rural Physicians of Canada, 2008). While each initiative
attempted to address the challenges of recruiting and retaining HCPs, they tend to focus
on physicians, and have generally attracted those already interested in rural practice, but
have not convinced individuals to move from urban to rural. As of 2009, 35 northern
Ontario communities and 98 southern Ontario communities still qualified as
underserviced despite these programs.
Beyond this, retention continues to be important. As previously discussed, HCPs leave
practice for a variety of reasons including ongoing causes of moral distress and moral
residue (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007; Juthberg et al., 2008; Ulrich et al., 2007). The
isolation of rural communities has the potential to both mitigate and exacerbate these
situations.

2.5.3.2.2

Resource provision: medical, technological,
educational, ethical

Within the literature review, the budgetary restrictions of rural health care facilities
appear repeatedly. These restrictions decrease access to supplies and the ability to
provide certain services (such as round-the-clock care). Additionally, funding restrictions
mean challenges for providing staff with the most recent instruments and continuing
education to maintain and learn new skills (Hendrickx, 2006). Finally, and most pertinent
to this discussion, both finite financial and time resources, along with a lack of past
academic attention, presents significant challenges for providing useful and current
ethical resources, that can be feasibly used within the time frames available to rural HCPs
(Cook & Hoas, 2008; Nelson & Weeks, 2006).
Recently, a review of available ethics literature (Nelson & Weeks, 2006), followed by a
related call for action on the lack of resources (Nelson, Pomerantz, Howard, & Bushy,
2007) drew attention to the lack of consideration of rural ethical issues. Cook and Hoas
(2008) subsequently released findings concerning ethical issues faced by rural HCPs that
are often overlooked in traditional ethical analyses. The authors noted the lack of
availability of ethical resources, but also the lack of use of those resources when available
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by HCPs. Cook and Hoas recommended the following three strategies to address these
issues:
1. Expand what counts as an ethical issue, as rural dilemmas often occur within
more complex situations with multiple factors that need consideration;
2. Provide integrated resources that account for values and rural context, while
assisting HCPs to overcome issues that prevent willingness to act; and,
3. Finally, use system level approaches to bring dialogue to the bedside (2008, p.5556).
Other key issues identified include the limited time available to use traditional ethical
resources, such as ethics committees. Various authors have critiqued and added to this
work. Critiques include proposals for more effective use of ethics committees in both
rural and urban settings (Pope, 2008) and the Texas A&M Health Science Center Rural
Community Health Institute’s virtual peer review and ethics committee as potential
solutions (Bolin, Mechler, Holcomb, & Williams, 2008). While laudable for creativity in
providing a more independent review and accountability, these recommendations fail to
address the time concern expressed by the HCPs in the Cook and Hoas' (2008) findings.
A concern identified as a motivating factor in the lack of use these similar existing
structures receive.
Crowden (2008) and Aultman (2008) recommend additions to Pope's (2008) and Bolin
and colleague's (2008) proposals to accommodate rural values through a virtual ethics
approach and discussion forums respectively. These ideas responded to other critiques
that there is a failure to account for rural culture (Crowden, 2008). While both Crowden
(2008) and Aultman (2008) show how their approaches address this oversight, and move
toward addressing the need to integrate rural context and values into the consideration,
they fail to consider the lack of rural HCP time and ethical education that presents a
barrier to use of these systems.
In contrast, Morley and Beatty (2008) and Vernillo (2008) argue that Cook and Hoas
(2008) are correct that a new systems approach is necessary; however, suggest that Cook
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and Hoas’s (2008) proposal merely addresses the symptoms of the problem. Vernillo
(2008) notes that ethical solutions have two potential approaches to resolution: the pointy
(HCP focused) end that Cook and Hoas (2008) address and the blunt (administrative) end
that is ignored. Vernillo (2008) recommends a reversal that starts with manager,
administrative, and policy changes. While Vernillo (2008) clearly points to the need to
change more than the views and knowledge of HCPs, the proposal rings of idealism that
appears to forget the complex and messy nature of ethics in rural communities. While
useful, Vernillo’s (2008) proposal would do better in conjunction with the already
proposed strategies by the other authors.
Ultimately, none of the presented recommendations fully address the call for resources
that “integrate value assumptions and contextual realities with strategies that help
healthcare providers overcome the barriers that inhibit a willingness to take action”
(Cook & Hoas, 2008). If solutions are to meet specifically rural needs, they need to
address these recommendations and the HCP identified need for those resources to be
“interactive, non-academic, inclusive, timely, practical, and [able to] sustain dialogue
about everyday problems within and across professions” (p. 55).
This chapter considered duty as it relates to the HCP and to the patient, conscientious
objection in health care, a definition of conscience, as it is used in this thesis, a discussion
of moral distress and moral residue and how both relate to conscientious objection. How
the term rural is used in this thesis was defined. Finally, a determinants of health
approach was used to discuss the implications of the rural context for these areas.
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Chapter 3

3

The Gap

The goal of this thesis is to provide a discussion of how conscientious objection by a
nurse or physician in a rural setting should be addressed, when that objection is based on
a centrally held value or belief, and whether current strategies are morally sufficient. This
section will summarize the discussion thus far and explicate the areas needing attention
as highlighted by the preceding literature review.

3.1 Duty
HCPs face conflicting duties: duty as individuals and family members to protect and care
for their own families, and duty as HCPs to provide care to patients or arrange for
alternative care if the HCP is unable to provide the required care (this includes declaring
conflicts of interest, limiting dual relationships, and acting in the patient's best interests).
In situations of imminent harm, HCPs are expected to set aside concerns for their own
well-being (including personal values and beliefs) and provide the necessary care.
These duties create considerable challenges for HCPs who experience a conflict between
their duties and personal values or beliefs. Any foreseeable conflict must be declared up
front, and conflicts that are not in the patient’s ‘best interests’ might serve as sufficiently
weighty to overrule the HCP's objection. Moreover, for rural HCPs, transferring care and
avoiding dual relationships presents a special challenge in small communities where there
are limited alternative providers and community members often know each other.
In addition, the duty to put patient's needs ahead of their own in situations of imminent
danger eliminates the ability for the HCP to object, while the duty to transfer care if
prevented by an alternative duty (such as personal belief) from caring for a patient
presents challenges for providers who do not have access to alternative HCPs to whom
they can transfer their patients. While this standard (Canadian Medical Association,
2004; Canadian Nurses Association, 2008b) assumes these events to be an exceptional
situation, it is foreseeable that these situations occur more frequently in rural settings
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given the poorer health status typical of rural populations and lack of alternative HCPs to
whom patients can be transferred, which leaves HCPs in a position of needing to set aside
values and beliefs in favour of patient needs.

3.1.1

Duty of patients

Some discussion of patient's duties to HCPs is beginning to permeate the literature.
Potentially patients have a duty to recognize the conflicting duties of their HCPs and not
expect the HCPs to transcend what counts as reasonable risk.
It is conceivable that a hitherto unconsidered competing duty is the duty doctors and
nurses have to themselves as moral and spiritual individuals. Potentially, patients have a
duty to recognize and respect those aspects of their HCPs as well.

3.2 Conscientious objection
The current standard for an HCP who conscientiously objects, but who is unable to
transfer the patient in need of urgent care to another provider, requires the HCP to lay
aside personal conflicts and provide the required care. In such a situation, when patient
transfer to another provider or an urban center is not possible, a conscientious objection
carries a significantly bad consequence that it is reasonable to assume that some people
would conclude objecting is morally reprehensible.
However, if
(a) conscience is considered to impact an HCP's ability to make good/ethical choices both
present and future, and
(b) conscience development is harmed when one is forced to contravene actions dictated
by conscience (leading to ethical distress and moral residue),
then
(c) the preceding duty could mean that HCPs are placed in a position that harms their
ability to practice ethically in the future.
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Given (a), (b), (c), and
(d) the poorer health status typical of rural populations, and
(e) lack of alternative HCPs to whom patients can be transferred,
The conclusion follows that
(f) HCPs are potentially lead to a position of needing to set aside values and beliefs in
favour of patient needs more frequently than previously considered and as a result
potentially harming their conscientious development.

3.3 Moral distress
Moral distress is experienced by all HCPs, but what situations cause moral distress varies
from person to person depending on moral sensitivity (MacPhail, 2003). As shown, moral
residue might be considered the outcome of a failure or inability to conscientiously object
in the face of a conflict with a core value or belief. The literature clearly indicates that
environments that foster discussions about treatment decisions and where HCPs feel able
to voice concerns diminish both the resulting moral distress and moral residue.
Unaddressed moral residue leads to increased financial burden and decreased quality of
care delivery, in addition moral residue appears to increase the rate of HCP attrition.
However, moral distress can help an HCP to clarify core values, competing commitments
and duties, and help HCPs determine when issues are personal or system based and need
advocacy from the HCP to create change. However, failing to address issues of
conscience and failing to respect or recognize conscientious judgments can decrease
future ability for ethical decision making by leading to denial, trivialization and
unreflective acceptance of incoherent beliefs and actions.

3.4 Rural context
Rural HCPs experience an expanded scope of practice, with a decreased number of peers
who can provide support, and a decreased ability to transport patients for alternative care.
Rural inhabitants are often sicker than urban counterparts and experience factors in
almost every determinant of health that increase the risk for poorer health and poorer
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health outcomes. As a result rural HCPs can expect to be working with more acutely ill
individuals who have waited longer to access health services and will be more likely to
be in need of urgent care. Situations that make patients vulnerable, especially issues
surrounding dual relationships, gender, and culture mean that HCPs hold even more
influence and authority than urban counterparts, with less peer supervision. The potential
consequences to misuse of that influence and authority, even accidently, are greater and
therefore requirements for ethical expertise and vigilance from those HCPs are even more
important than in urban areas, as discussed in the previous chapter. Ethical expertise
refers to the ability to assess and respond to ethically challenging situations in specific
area. For example, a doctor may be expected to have medical ethical expertise that allows
said doctor to discern the best course of action given two treatment options (a) a more
expensive, but more effective therapy or (b) a more economical and reasonably effective
therapy given the patient’s presentation.
A benefit of rural practice is that rural HCPs are more likely to listen to and communicate
with each other, and as a result may be able to respond more quickly to changing
professional dynamics that require greater inter-professional communication and cooperation. This may be due to practice contexts that are smaller in size, as well as
increased levels of communication between rural HCPs, as compared to their urban
counterparts. However, like their urban counterparts, health care services in rural areas
are still provided within the context of an organizational hierarchy, and this can lead to
feelings of powerlessness by those lower in the hierarchy whether actual or perceived, for
example nurses compared to doctors (Beshiri & Bollman, 2001a).
These issues of isolation, and reduced access to alternative providers, are aggravated by
challenges in recruiting sufficient HCPs to rural areas, further decreasing community
members' access to health care services. Financial issues mean that rural HCPs also have
less access to medical and technological resources that might mitigate some of the ethical
challenges these HCPs face. Lack of extra personnel makes rural HCP time valuable and
in demand, and decreases the ability of HCPs to attend further education and investigate
and debate ethical dilemmas. Finally there are a lack of ethical resources that meet the
unique needs of rural HCPs, specifically the need for resources to be “interactive, non-
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academic, inclusive, timely, practical, and [able to] sustain dialogue about everyday
problems within and across professions” (Cook & Hoas, 2008, p.55).

3.5 Conscience
The definition of conscience explored in this thesis raises some serious questions
surrounding the current treatment of HCPs who make a claim based on conscience.
Currently HCPs are permitted to make claims to conscience, but whether claims based on
"secular" reasoning are treated equally to those made based on "religious" reasoning is
unclear, especially in rural situations where alternative HCPs are limited at best. This
definition also potentially allows for a greater ease in distinguishing between bias and
prejudice, and veritable conscience claims.
Furthermore, this discussion suggests that conscience plays a significant role in the
development of moral distress. This suggests that there is a lack of consideration
regarding that potential avenue for decreasing distress and improving HCP retention in
rural communities where attrition is due to moral distress and HCPs feeling unsupported.

3.6 Need for a better method
Despite fragmented discussion in various subject areas, solutions proposed for addressing
issues of conscientious objection, patient vulnerability, ethical conflicts and dilemmas,
within a rural setting have consistently failed to meet the needs of HCPs in that setting.
The thesis proposes to consider whether current standards for addressing conscientious
objection of HCPs in rural health care are sufficient, and will then provide
recommendations for moving forward in this complex problem.
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Chapter 4

4

Methodology

Wide reflective equilibrium (WRE) was chosen both as a theory and method for this
thesis to meet several key criteria: accessibility to a range of audiences, acceptability to
individuals of varied backgrounds, beliefs, and perspectives, credibility among experts in
moral reasoning, practicality for use in addressing specific moral problems, and
flexibility in use (Arras, 2007). WRE provides a method for choosing between competing
values and beliefs (Rashid, 2002).
To provide a clear explication of both the theory and application of WRE, review of the
literature pertinent to reflective equilibrium relied on two general strategies: review of the
initial major explications of reflective equilibrium to form a foundation of understanding;
and a literature survey from 1990 to present to assess uses and recent developments in the
theory and method. Major contributors to the formulation of WRE that predate 1990 are
also cited within this section.
An exhaustive review of WRE exceeds the scope of this thesis; as such, this section will
provide a broad understanding of the theory with a focus on its specific application to this
project

4.1 Overview of reflective equilibrium
Rawls (1999) introduced the concept of reflective equilibrium (RE) as a method for
providing justification for theories about justice in "A Theory of Justice". This work
systematized and set out the method, even though others had discussed similar concepts
previously, and served as a major starting point for many subsequent scholars. RE as
proposed by Rawls consisted of two elements, considered moral judgements and moral
principles, and was explicitly expanded by Norman Daniels to include a third, relevant
background theories. The initial explication of RE became recognized by the term
Narrow Reflective Equilibrium (NRE), while the broader explication by Daniels
incorporating relevant background theories became recognized as WRE.
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Considered moral judgments are conclusions or judgments that are reached under
conditions likely to avoid errors (Daniels, 1980), by individuals who are reasonable,
impartial, intelligent, informed, imaginative, etc. (Arras, 2007). For example, when trying
to determine whether to break a promise, Scanlon (1992) considers 'why is it wrong to
break a promise?' Initially, a person may take into consideration various 'judgments' that
contribute to that individual's reasoning about why or why not it may be wrong to break a
promise. Second, the individual would identify those 'judgments' or reasons that were
derived in situations where the individual lacked all relevant facts, were unreliable
(formed while angry, frightened, or upset), made with hesitation, or that change overtime
(Scanlon, 2002; Schroeter, 2004) and those judgments are removed from consideration
leaving only the "judgments" the individual is most confident with. These are the
considered moral judgments.

Moral Principles are developed from these considered moral judgements, in an effort to
"'match', 'explicate', 'accord with', 'fit', or 'account for', the body of intuitions amassed by
the competent moral judges" (Arras, 2007, p.50). The goal of the chosen moral principles
is to provide the best possible explanation for the considered judgements, recognizing
that a perfect match with all considered judgements is unlikely (Scanlon, 1992).
Practically, moral principles attempt to explain the collection of considered judgements in
the most complete or comprehensive way possible for that set of considered judgements,
so that an individual following those principles would arrive at the same set of considered
judgements (Scanlon, 2002). Given our example, the individual would attempt to find a
set of principles that explicate the considered judgements. When principles did not
completely explicate the original set of considered judgements, the individual would need
to make the most plausible adjustments (Schroeter, 2004) between the two groups.
Sometimes the principles may clarify why two considered judgements contradict each
other and the individual would eliminate or adjust the one that is least reliable or
plausible. This working back and forth continues until the considered judgements
coincide with the moral principles (Schroeter, 2004). The result is a set of moral
principles that explicate the considered moral judgements in a state of narrow reflective
equilibrium (NRE).
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Relevant background theories consist of theoretical considerations that are used to
challenge the moral principles and considered judgements. Arras (2007) outlines five
classifications of theoretical considerations: "(1) alternative 'moral conceptions' (e.g.
utilitarianism, perfectionism, Kantian ethics) and their respective philosophical warrants;
(2) theories of moral personhood; (3) theories of procedural justice; (4) theories of moral
development; and (5) empirical theories bearing on the nature of society and social
relations" (Arras, 2007, p.52). The goal of challenging the moral principles and
considered judgements with relevant background theories is to introduce alternative
sources of information that would elucidate errors and challenge the thinker to move
beyond biases and pre-conceptions.

Completing the process of developing moral principles that explicate the considered
judgements brings the individual into NRE. NRE has been critiqued for systematizing
any existing biases and smoothing inconsistencies in an individual's beliefs, but not
leading to new knowledge or helping resolve confusing and complex issues (Schroeter,
2004).

Daniels (1996b) proposed Wide Reflective Equilibrium (WRE) as a solution to this
critique. In WRE the individual must go further and seek any relevant background
theories and/or conflicting perspectives in order to challenge NRE and expose all
assumptions, considered judgements, and moral principles to scrutiny and potential
revision. By doing so, the individual hopes to highlight and utilize the strengths of each
element, resulting in a more robust product (Tersman, 1993). Essential to the strength of
this process is the independence of the relevant background theories from the original
considered judgments and moral principles (Daniels, 1996b). The same dynamic process
of working between the three components continues, adjusting the least reliable/plausible
components as they are elucidated by other components.

The conclusion of this process (a matching set of judgments, principles, and background
theories) is achieved when the individual is no longer inclined to change or revise any of
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these components because they have the "highest degree of acceptability or credibility"
(Daniels, 2003).

4.2 Critiques
4.2.1

WRE is foundational or intuitionist

One major criticism of WRE focuses on the initial considered judgments. Critics argue
that the initial considered judgements hold a greater weight than the moral principles or
relevant background theories, because these judgements have already been passed
through some scrutiny to eliminate any judgements considered unreliable. As a result
these judgments are held more firmly and are less likely to be revised than the moral
principles or relevant background theories when adjustments are required (Hare, 1973;
St. John, 2007). A secondary and related criticism argues that this tendency creates a
system that essentially determines its own trueness based on consensus with like-minded
individuals (Hare, 1973).
Scholars who ascribe to WRE represent a spectrum from using some foundational2 and
intuitionist3 claims (McMahan, 2000; Nielson, 1994) to arguing adamantly for the equal
reversibility of all components within WRE (Curtis et al., 2004). This thesis adheres to
the methodology explicated by the latter and this is the position defended below.
Numerous scholars have elaborated on, and defended, Rawls’ proposal (Daniels, 1980;
Rashid, 2002; Tersman, 1993); they argue that while it may appear that considered
judgements hold a preferential place, this is erroneous, and each element is independent
and equally considered. Daniels (1996a) acknowledges that while considered judgments
do initially carry additional weight, the process of first developing moral principles and
then seeking contradictory background theories helps to reveal these biases and brings to

2

Foundationalism holds that some moral facts are self-justifying and do not require the support of other
facts to be justified (McMahan, 2000)
3

Intuitionism holds that we come to know about moral facts through observation, not through their
relationship to self-justifying moral facts (McMahan, 2000)
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light inconsistencies. As a result initial preference gives way as the process progresses
and this testing process can lead to surprising conclusions.
Daniels' independence constraint (1980) answers the charge of a system that establishes
its own trueness via consensus. The relevant background theories used to challenge the
initial considered judgements and the moral principles must not derive from those same
judgements or principles. This independence of elements that provide support for the
argument ensures the quality of the argument. Daniels advocated that external and
potentially contradictory evidence must be sought to insure that moral judgments that
would otherwise go unchallenged are considered for revision. This may include "well
justified and widely accepted empirical factual beliefs including beliefs about the
functions of morality, the functioning of parts of the social structure (including the
economy) relevant to social facts, political realities, and relevant scientific
developments." (Nielsen, 2008, pg. 220). This answers criticism that RE allows an
individual to substantiate biased judgments with biased principles by introducing new
and contradictory sources of evidence to the process.

4.2.2

Initial considered judgements lack credibility

Another major critique centres on the source of the initial considered judgments, as some
scholars suggest that these lack credibility. Richard Brandt argues that without initial
credibility, there is no reason to conclude that the initial considered judgements lead us
toward truth (Brandt, 1979; Brandt, 1990)
Daniel's has addressed this criticism in varying ways. He has argued that the burden of
proof for moral "facts" should lie on the theory that emerges from WRE. Daniels
suggests that instead of initially offering a credibility argument, once the theory is
reached, the theory should indicate which 'facts' support the initial considered judgments
(Daniels, 1980). In later work Daniel argues that many moral theories (e.g.
Utilitarianism) experience challenges justifying their preliminary moral facts, but the
WRE is explicit about sources of bias' and historical accident and works to expose these
to criticism and correction instead of resorting to causal stories for justification (Daniels,
2003).
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4.2.3

WRE is too comprehensive to be useful

Since its formalization, WRE has gained acceptance and has been heralded as a
systematic way to justify moral theories. WRE granted equal priority to all types of
evidence, appealing to previously opposed factions in the debate over ethical methods
(Arras, 2007). Arras argues that WRE removes from each method "whatever is partial,
fragmentary, or one-sided about them, while their remaining valuable features are
preserved and elevated within a more comprehensive synthesis" (Arras, 2007, p.54).
However, critics argued that WRE is too comprehensive and provides no way to guide
decisions, and does not guarantee a true conclusion even if equilibrium is achieved.
The challenge of WRE lies is the comprehensive nature of the equilibrium called for.
Arras (2007) argues since all competing theoretical considerations must be included in
order to truly achieve WRE, and as this could easily occupy a professor's life's work,
WRE is too comprehensive, and the scope far too wide to make WRE useful. Nielson
addresses this arguing for a “wider” but not “wide” reflective equilibrium (1985, pg.139).
Other scholars also recognize the unlikelihood of achieving perfect equilibrium and
advocate for consideration of the most salient points in the use of relevant background
theories instead of attempting to reach complete WRE (Arras, 2007; Scanlon, 2002).
However, Arras’ argues that this restricts WRE to the theoretical ethicist and leaves the
practical bioethicist to work within the confines of something that resembles NRE (Arras,
2007). Arras concludes that WRE lacks the ability to guide how an individual should
proceed and provides little hope of drawing the widely disparate background theories into
a tight enough circle of equilibrium to guide decisions (2007, p57).
Ultimately, these critiques are not damaging to the use of RE or WRE in this thesis. The
goal is more aptly viewed as achieving agreement or consensus on the current moral
status of the treatment of Health Care professionals in rural settings who conscientiously
object, and suggest another direction (or directions) that might be considered, only
recommending a better, or potential, direction for action that is coherent with current
legal, societal, and moral expectations. This use is supported by Neilson who advocates
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recognition of this aspect of RE which allows “a recognizable kind of objectivity by that
intersubjective agreement” (1985, pg. 28). Furthermore, this use of RE to assess the
current moral status of the treatment of HCPs in rural settings who conscientiously
object, can be considered to fit neatly into Neilson’s argument that justice in modern
societies requires equal weight to the considerations of all parties’ interests (Nielsen,
1985, p. 58), which is precisely the goal of WRE.

4.2.4

WRE does not guarantee moral truth

A final critique suggests that coherence among the various elements of WRE does not
guarantee the conclusion is "moral truth", but merely that the elements do not contradict
each other (Arras, 2007; Hare, 1973)
This critique largely focuses on a larger issue within coherence theories, but does not
greatly impact this thesis. It is acknowledged that WRE does increase the probabilities of
converging on moral truth, by providing a systematic method for considering various
sources of evidence (Arras, 2007). WRE is unable to compensate for lack of information
or knowledge needed to make a decision, whether that lack is due to negligence on the
part of the user or due to a lack of progress in that area of knowledge acquisition by
society. This is a weakness of the method; however, lack of perfection does not remove
the obligation to do our best with the resources at hand. As such, this critique is a
valuable consideration in understanding the conclusions of this thesis; however, the
conclusions will provide the best possible answer to the question, given the information
currently available.

4.3 Specific application
Within this thesis the goal was to demonstrate whether current strategies for dealing with
HCPs who conscientiously object are incongruent and require reworking, given Canadian
ideals and standards, based on law, practice, and values. The goal of WRE is not to
achieve a perfectly delineated set of principles to explicate all moral questions, but
instead to provide sufficient guidance and flexibility to allow beliefs to progress morally
(Scanlon, 1992).
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It is important to recognize that while full WRE may not be attainable within the limits of
this thesis, wider reflective equilibrium is preferable (in this thesis) to NRE. This is
because NRE does not provide a means of considering alternative perspectives and
systems (Daniels, 2003). Similarly, it will be necessary to clearly indicate the considered
moral judgements, moral principles, and background competing theories that are
considered, to clearly demonstrate the equal consideration provided to each and avoid the
charge of favouring one element over the other. This thesis cannot be compared and
assessed based on the typical criteria used to assess thesis work within the natural
sciences. However, limiting the scope to discussing the specific treatment of Health Care
Professionals in the rural Canadian context, evidence and competing considerations from
rural Canadian ideals (as identified in the literature) and standards (based on laws,
policies, and reported values), allows for a preliminary assessment of the congruency of
current practices and proposal of a more congruent approach.
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Chapter 5

5

Quality criteria

The interdisciplinary nature of this thesis produces unique challenges for establishing
criteria for assessing the quality of the final thesis. These criteria need to be acceptable to
a large audience with diverse views including the traditionally post positivist views of
philosophy and the traditionally constructivist views of health science. As such, this
thesis attempts to use parallel criteria from quantitative and qualitative research
methodologies, which while critiqued in the literature, do allow for disparate audiences to
understand and assess materials in a more familiar context (Morrow, 2005).
To ensure the quality of the research and conclusions of this thesis the following criteria
are used as recommended by Caelli, Ray, and Mill (2003):
1. Clear description of theoretical positioning
2. Consistency between methodology and methods used
3. Knowledgeable and theoretically informed approach to rigor
4. Explicit discussion of the researcher's presuppositions as they come to bear on the
research.

5.1 Clear description of theoretical positioning
As outlined by various authors (Caelli et al., 2003; Eakin & Mykhalovskiy, 2003;
Morrow, 2005) the researcher's theoretical positioning and background as it influences
the research should be clearly articulated.

5.2 Consistency between methodology and methods used
The techniques used for gathering and analyzing the research should be consistent with
the methodology's underlying assumptions, especially those assumptions surrounding
truth and how value is assessed to the various aspects of the research (Caelli et al., 2003;
Morrow, 2005). This is especially important in a methodology such as Reflective
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Equilibrium, as this requires continual adjustment of the principles, considered moral
judgments, and competing theories.

5.3 Knowledgeable and theoretically informed approach to
rigor
The research needs to articulate a theoretically informed approach to ensuring rigor
(Caelli et al., 2003), which reflects a "philosophically and methodologically congruent"
(Caelli et al., 2003, p. 15) approach. This approach needs to allow for dependability
(parallel to reliability in quantitative research) in results that come from a clear
articulation of the development of the research design and an audit trail that other
researchers might follow (Morrow, 2005).

5.4 Explicit discussion of the researcher's presuppositions
as they come to bear on the research
Caelli, Ray and Mill (2003) use the term analytic lens to refer to the biases and values
researchers bring to their data that ultimately affect how that data is viewed and
interpreted. Morrow (2005) and Eakin and Mykhalovskiy (2003) also discuss the
importance of explicating these presuppositions so that the audience is clear on how they
may have influenced conclusions and how data was gathered.

5.5 Specific application
For this thesis these quality criteria are met by:
1. Clear explication of the author's position and background
2. Using a methodology (WRE) that, while acceptable to both qualitative and quantitative
audiences, allows for multiple sources of evidence to be assessed and considered in
parallel. This methodology does not ascribe privileged status to any one source of
information (considered moral judgements, moral principles, or relevant background
theories). This methodology has a clearly delineated method that helps to ensure
consistency. In this thesis, that includes establishing a set of considered judgements based
on a literature review, developing moral principles that explicate those considered
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judgements and seeking additional relevant background theories that challenge both the
considered judgements and moral principles through additional literature review and
discussion with faculty. At all times during development, each component of the thesis is
open to complete revision based on new or challenging sources of evidence.
3. By ensuring adherence to the method of RE, and ensuring a wide source of the
evidence (principles, considered judgments, and competing theories) used in reaching
conclusions; as well as providing an audit trail of conclusions reached. In addition, a
diverse group of scholars have provided criticism of this thesis. This includes Dr.
Kenneth Kirkwood, health ethics, who provided direction for the thesis as a whole; Dr.
Eliza Hurley, bioethics and philosophy, who provided input on the methodology and
method; Dr. Beverly Leipert, nursing and rural health care, who provided input on the
literature review and critiques of assumptions regarding rural issues including the
inclusion of nurses and nurse practitioners; and Dr. Marilyn Evans, nursing and health
ethics, who provided later input and critical consideration of the thesis as a whole
suggesting further areas for consideration. Dr. Evans provided considerable critique
leading to the incorporation of compassion fatigue, burn out, and challenges related
specifically to nursing and elimination of other conclusions from the final thesis. In
addition, early in the research process Dr. Sokol (External to The University of Western
Ontario) provided email discussion and suggestions regarding avenues for research
specifically surrounding conscience and moral distress.
4. By explicating which evidence was given greatest weight and justification for those
choices so that the audience may understand why conclusions were reached. This was
done throughout the literature review.
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Chapter 6

6

Analysis

The preceding chapters outlined the background information and literature related to rural
health care delivery and the HCPs involved; described the challenges faced in the rural
environment that lead to ethical challenges and conscientious objection; and outlined a
methodology for analyzing current practices and suggesting new strategies for addressing
these issues. This chapter will synthesize this information, identifying the considered
moral judgements that evolve from this information, distilling those judgements to moral
principles that match with and explicate this body of information, and consider
competing background information in order to provide recommendations in wide
reflective equilibrium. For ease of understanding, the information is presented as the
moral principle, followed by the considered moral judgements and competing
background theories related to those principles.
Upon review of the preceding literature and information, three major principles become
evident as explaining and fitting with that body of information:
1. People, who are responsible for making challenging and irreversible ethical
decisions, should be provided with the tools (education, resources, etc.), power,
and practice (or experience) to make those decisions and develop the “ethical
expertise” for doing so competently within that field.
2. If there is a way to prevent or reduce harm (specifically ethical trauma or moral
distress) in a specific set of health care professionals, then the people who have
authority over those individuals have a responsibility to act on that ability to
reduce or prevent that harm, if it is feasible, and practical to do so.
3. Human beings and citizens are social creatures with multiple competing loyalties
and duties. Their professional roles cannot be considered in exclusion to these
competing interests. This is especially true of rural professionals who play
multiple roles within a community.
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An explication of the support for each of the preceding principles follows and expanded
discussion of the specific principle below. To aid in understanding, the example cited
from May (2001) is revisited in each step.

6.1 Principle 1
HCPs in rural communities are placed in positions that require them to make both
challenging and often irreversible ethical decisions regarding patient care and treatment.
These HCPs need to be provided with the requisite education (including ongoing
education) and resources, as well as the authority and experience to make those decisions
and to ensure that the best care and most ethical conduct are the outcomes of each
situation. This requires opportunities to develop the skills for negotiating ethical
dilemmas in health care, and recognizes the increased influence and authority already
present that requires greater ethical expertise to negotiate situations that may challenge
HCPs trying to negotiate between strong competing values.

6.1.1

Developing ethical decision making skills

As discussed, rural HCPs are more likely to encounter situations where delay in treating a
patient could lead to imminent harm and even death. Moreover, because rural HCPs
practice in a greater number of areas, and need to maintain expertise in those areas, there
is a higher probability that HCPs will be placed into situations in which they do not have
recent training or experience to direct their decisions. Additionally, as discussed there is a
higher the probability of the rural HCP encountering a greater variety of ethical dilemmas
than an HCP in an urban setting might encounter.
In addition, the personal health practices, workplaces, context of rural health care
delivery, and longer travel times to health care services often leads to patients arriving for
treatment sicker and with more complications, than urban patients. This can be further
complicated by a lack of ability to transfer patients for various reasons including weather
conditions, availability of alternative providers (or willingness or ability of those
providers) to take over difficult cases, and the refusal of rural individuals to be
transported away from trusted providers and support networks.
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Finally, the proclivity of dual relationships in rural communities, the inability to access
continuing medical education regularly, and lack of time to wait for ethics committee
decisions, due to increased medical complications upon arrival and demands on HCP
time, can further challenge an HCP who attempts to make sound ethical decisions.
As a result, it is important for HCPs to have the opportunity to develop the skills to
manage these situations and make the required decisions through continuous practice and
opportunities to learn. This requires exposure to more challenging experiences over time,
in situations with increasingly severe consequences for making incorrect choices. These
experiences should progress with decreasing support and an ongoing opportunity to learn
from and correct mistakes throughout the process, so that when faced with challenging
novel situations the HCP has a bank of previous experience to draw on when determining
how to proceed.
In the presented example, the patient will die without the needed surgery; however, the
surgeon is unwilling to provide the surgery unless the patient agrees to accept blood
products if needed. If the patient cannot be transported to the nearest alternative hospital
that could provide the surgery, and the objecting surgeon is the most capable HCP of
performing the surgery in the area, then the dilemma becomes more complex as
transferring patient care is no longer an alternative.
If, during training electives, the surgeon had been given specific ethically focused
preparation then she would be able to make the distinction between issues of conscience
which relate to type of activity as opposed to situations where she is imposing a value
judgement. For example objecting to all such surgeries on principle compared with
assessing whether a ten percent chance of death without blood product is worth the risk to
the patient. Education surrounding ethical decision-making, combined with experience
negotiating dilemmas throughout the training process, would allow this surgeon to
navigate the presented scenario with greater ethical expertise.
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6.1.2

Increased authority and influence requires increased ethical
expertise

In addition to facing complex and unique ethical dilemmas, HCPs in rural areas are often
in situations of potentially greater power (influence and/or authority) over both patients
and depending on the HCP's position in the hierarchy, coworkers (including
administrators). In part, this difference is due to the isolation from alternative providers
where patients might access the same service, and the potential for decreased health
status among rural citizens, which forces them to utilize what health services are
available. This increased power requires increased accountability, but also an increased
ability to make ethically challenging decisions as the increased power provides
opportunities to make, but also to hide, ethically challenging decisions.
First, in rural areas several subsets of the population, especially minorities, are considered
vulnerable with less ability to advocate for themselves (Leipert, 2006) making it more
important to respect and be sensitive to the cultural and religious decision-making
strategies and value systems of these vulnerable individuals. For example, in her research
with rural and northern women, Leipert (1999) discusses how physicians may be unaware
of abuse suffered by women in their community because the women feel they cannot talk
to the doctor that their husband sees. This speaks to the extreme importance of physicians
being perceived as not only trustworthy, but holding a high standard of confidentiality.
By ensuring that HCPs are aware of potential biases toward their patients, and that HCPs
are held accountable for their interactions with those patients in a manner patients can
recognize, it is possible to minimize this effect. Patients need to have the confidence that
they can speak up to other providers of inappropriate treatment or breaches in
confidentiality, which may translate to a willingness to trust HCPs with sensitive
information. In addition, if HCPs are already working to minimize situations that may
cause difficulty for patients, this will also improve this challenge.
Furthermore, HCPs often encounter situations in which they know a specific course of
action is necessary, but are constrained from following that action. In that situations
HCPs may bend the rules to ensure that a patient receives care. However, without safe
guards in place, one patient may receive additional care while another goes without. Also,
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such decisions are not usually documented (Kälvemark et al., 2004), which means policy
makers do not have the opportunity to correct systemic issues; because, they are unaware
that the issues exist. For example, doctors and nurses in Kälvemark and colleague's
(2004) study discuss bending rules to provide patients with medication they could not
afford, choosing not to provide a treatment to older patients despite regulations and
justifying it officially as too risky in order to preserve resources for other patients and
prevent discomfort to the patient, and many other examples. In many of these situations
the reasoning is laudable "you do it for the patient," "you do it because it is more ethical
in a humanitarian way," (Kälvemark et al., 2004); however, it is doubtful that this rule
bending occurs for all patients in the same situation. Would a nurse bend the rules to
provide additional medication to the aggressive patient in the same way he or she might
for a child of destitute parents? Even if both will go without needed medication?
Possibly, possibly not. Ultimately the HCPs are aware they make these decisions to avoid
issues of conscientious conflict (Kälvemark et al., 2004). Without oversight and
documentation on these situations, there is no way to ensure that these episodes of rule
bending are evenly distributed and no long-term method in place for addressing the issue.
Furthermore, individuals in rural communities need to trust their HCPs, or they are less
likely to seek treatment. Unlike urban communities, rural individuals have less
opportunity to select an alternative HCP in situations of impaired trust. This trust and
isolation, further decreases the opportunities a patient has to control his or her
interactions with the HCP. This is further decreased by the lack of education, which is
common, among community members other than the HCPs and other professionals. In a
situation with limited alternative providers, with limited knowledge of his or her right to
request transfers of care and alternative types of care, a individual may feel trapped under
the care of a physician he or she does not trust. If this individual is in dire need of
treatment that only a physician can provide, he or she may be hesitant to voice his or her
concerns for fear of angering the physician on whom he or she is reliant for good care.
It is important for HCPs to be more vigilant and have good ethical expertise to navigate
the potentially challenging situations that may arise day to day, even seemingly minor
ones such as the examples of rule bending, which still have ethical implications. In
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addition, the HCPs need to have some form of accountability in place to facilitate both
refining of those abilities and prevent missteps from going unnoticed, even better would
be the opportunity to document exceptions to allow for future changes to the policies that
cause conscience conflicts that result in these choices.

6.2 Principle 2
Generally, it is accepted that individuals in authority have a duty to provide for the needs
of those they are in authority over. Fire chiefs must ensure that fire fighters have the
appropriate equipment to fight fires without undue risk, doctors and nurses must address
the needs of patients, and administrators, policy makers and managers must provide for
the wellbeing of their employees as it relates to the workplace environment. This value
in Canadian society has recently been confirmed by the passage of Bill 168 holding
employers ethically and legally responsible for not taking action when an employee is in
danger, or if an employee is suffering emotional harm (in the form of harassment or
bullying at work) (Government of Ontario, 2009). It follows that if there is a way to
prevent or reduce harm (specifically ethical trauma or moral distress) in a specific set of
health care professionals, then the people who have authority over those individuals have
a responsibility to act on that ability to reduce or prevent that harm, if doing so does not
cause undue hardship to that employer (it must be feasible and possible).

6.2.1

Methods exist to decrease moral distress in HCPs

A key element imposing responsibility for action on those in authority over HCP's who
may conscientiously object and experience moral distress, is the requirement that a
resolution be both feasible and possible. Several researchers have determined that there
are ways to decrease moral distress for HCPs, and since moral distress, as discussed
previously, is an outcome of a conscientious objection that is not respected (whether by
the individual or the institution) it follows that administrators should work to decrease
both if these recommendations are attainable given the limitations placed on
administrators.
While some moral distress can be positive, forcing the individual to clarify values and
commitments; overwhelmingly, the research indicates that most moral distress is
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detrimental both to the individual and to the employer. As Webster and Baylis (2000)
argue, moral distress leads to moral residue, and this can lead to “denial of the
incoherence between beliefs and actions, trivialization of the incoherence between beliefs
and actions, or unreflective acceptance of the incoherence between beliefs and actions”
(p.225). Essentially, the individual’s ability to act as a moral agent, someone who makes
and acts on ethical decisions, has been harmed.
Furthermore, it is reasonable to expect that moderate inconvenience to these individuals
in authority would be tolerable, given the financial implications and detriment to patient
outcomes as 25-45% of nurses and 3% of doctors leave their positions, or are considering
leaving due to these issues, and the quality of care received by patients has been shown to
decrease when providers have moral residue (Bell & Breslin, 2008; Hamric & Blackhall,
2007; Ulrich et al., 2007). This represents a significant financial cost, both in recruitment
and training efforts to replace these HCPs, and in the lack of productivity leading up to
the HCP's decision to leave. It also represents a cost to the quality of care received by
patients.
In the scenario involving the surgeon who refuses to conduct the surgery without the
option to use blood products, simply over-ruling the objection might result in moral
distress and ultimately moral residue, especially if the patient were to die. This distress
could eventually cause the surgeon to leave practice in rural areas to avoid being forced
into a similar future situation. Administrators would then be forced to recruit a new
surgeon and incur the costs of both recruitment and the workplace training.
Evidently, recognizing and decreasing moral distress makes sense financially, for patient
care, and for preventing harm in HCPs. Moreover, research such as that conducted by
Laschinger, Almost, and Tuer-Hodes (2003) shows that increasing autonomy and control
improves retention and even attracts HCPs to hospital environments. In addition, the
strategies discussed, such as fostering discussions about treatment decisions, do not
suggest a large financial or educational investment is needed (Hamric & Blackhall, 2007;
Ulrich et al., 2007). As such, strategies exist for decreasing moral distress that are
feasible and possible to implement.
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For the objecting surgeon, fostering a discussion with the attending nurse regarding the
reasons for the objection, might elucidate the faulty reasoning. By allowing the surgeon
to recognize that she would provide this surgery in other situations, and is simply making
a judgement about the choice the patient makes, not the morality of conducting the
indicated surgery, such a discussion might resolve the perceived conflict. But, for such a
dialogue to occur administrators would need to foster an environment that both
encourages dialogue about conscience issues, and protects subordinate staff from reprisal
for voicing concerns. The result of such dialogue would be the prevention of distress in
the surgeon, and ultimately the costly requirement to fill her vacancy.

6.2.2

Impact of a value, not the value's source, should determine
the credibility of the value

As previously discussed, whether a value is informed by religious or secular (nonreligious) sources does not change the consequences contravention of that centrally held
value has on an individual. As such, even values others deem “ridiculous” and “absurd”
cannot be lightly dismissed, even when the majority of people concur that the value is
“ridiculous” or “absurd”. The only factor that should be used to determine the reaction to
a claim to conscience is the impact of that value on the individual, if the value meets the
requirements for a claim to conscience. Consider the following examples:
Example 1: Dr. Smith refuses to provide a recommendation for elderly Mr. Jones to
receive a heart transplant, because Dr. Smith believes the risk to Mr. Jones is greater than
the potential benefit and Dr. Smith believes that the resources must go to a patient in need
of treatment who has a better chance to benefit.
Example 2: Dr. Smith refuses to prescribe oral contraceptives to Ms. Jones because Dr.
Smith believes that the treatment denies the sacredness of life, which Dr. Smith believes
includes interfering with God's plan by preventing pregnancy.
Both scenarios presented involve a judgement where the doctor refuses to provide an
accepted treatment option. However, the first example uses an argument on non-religious
grounds, while the second uses religious grounds. Based on the definition of conscience,
both situations should be treated and evaluated equally if the patient or another HCP
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raises concern with this refusal. One refusal should not be considered less credible for
being based on religious grounds.

6.2.3

Current provisions do not meet this responsibility in a rural
setting

Current strategies in place to mitigate impact on HCPs include allowing HCPs to refuse
to provide care and to transfer care if the HCP is unable to provide care or a
conscientious objection occurs. However, in practice HCPs are expected to provide care
in emergencies or if transfer is not possible. While this practice may allow urban HCPs to
avoid situations of conflict, as discussed this is not typically a feasible possibility for
rural HCPs due to weather, lack of support, and other restrictions. Although the current
standards of practice make allowances for conscientious objection, these allowances are
difficult, if not impossible, to apply in the rural practice context. As a result rural HCPs
are placed in a position of undue risk to their consciences, because the current standards
of practice do not take the rural context into account, and fail to provide the supports and
protections they purport to provide.
In the example, current strategies would require the surgeon to provide the treatment she
objects to, because no option for transfer is available. As a result the surgeon may leave
her position in the community, or to cope with the stress caused by this conflict become
less sensitive to challenging future ethical situations.

6.2.4

Presented solutions are feasible and possible

Various potential methods for addressing conscientious objection and decreasing or
preventing moral distress have been discussed. These include encouraging interprofessional dialogue, providing improved ethical training to HCPs, and instituting a
system of expectations and protections surrounding claims to conscience.
First, several authors discuss the evidence that increased dialogue between professionals
decreases moral distress. Some authors suggest that this method is particularly effective
in preventing moral distress that occurs when one party (often nurses) feels that the other
party (often doctors) has not taken into account essential considerations in making a
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decision. For example, Varcoe, Doane, Pauly, Rodney, and colleagues (2004) discuss
their findings that junior nurses (in the presence of more senior staff) and nurses in
general (with regard to physicians) find it very challenging ethically when those higher in
the hierarchy dismiss potentially lifesaving observations. Varcoe and colleagues give the
specific example of a nurse whose concerns were dismissed “when she attempted to
report that a computer failure was responsible for abnormal cardiac readings for a
particular patient” (2004, p. 322). Other authors have noted that rural health care centres
already have an increased level of trust and dialogue between HCPs when compared to
urban centres and attribute this to the reduced number of professionals involved in
providing care, and the need for HCPs to rely on each other with reduced resources
(Scharff, 2006; Troyer & Lee, 2006). As such, published recommendations that have
shown success at mitigating moral distress, such as increased inter-professional dialogue,
are both feasible and reasonable modifications that rural centres are ideally situated to
encourage and formalize among HCPs.
Second, various authors have repeatedly identified the need for further ethical resources
and training for rural HCPs (Cook & Hoas, 2008; Nelson et al., 2006); however, the
challenge in meeting this need often revolves around time available to HCPs and the
difficultly traveling to and having time for continuing medical education (CME)
(Hendrickx, 2006). Other authors have called for a Rural Health Specialty and several
medical and nursing schools have now implemented rural health electives for students
(The University of Western Ontario, 2011; The University of Western Ontario, 2013). It
would be possible for medical and nursing schools to include more ethical education
within the rural electives, and the new virtual ethics committees might also assist in
directing HCPs in less time constrained cases. Also, deliberately structuring rural medical
rotations to include a progressive exposure to making ethically challenging decisions,
first with support and progressing toward independence, would provide rural HCPs the
opportunity to develop the ethical expertise needed along with the 'gut instinct' to make
the rapid decisions needed as they progress in their medical career. The deliberate
inclusion of an ethics component in rural medical education, in addition to the other
changes, would require some modification to current methods of training, but do not
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require large financial or time investments and as such should be feasible even for small
communities.
To address ongoing concerns Morton and Kirkwood’s (2009) recommendation for
increased accountability and protection regarding claims to conscience should be
implemented. This includes expecting HCPs to defend claims to conscience to other
HCPs and administrators, and places responsibility on other HCPs and administrators to
provide counter evidence if they believe the objecting HCP is in error. While, HCPs are
expected to question actions they consider not in their patient's best interest, this does not
always occur. This method would create an expectation of such questioning, ensure that
HCPs have the freedom to openly discuss objections, decrease the perceived need for
'justified rule bending4' and increase the opportunity for clear documentation of where
objections arise so potential systemic issues that need to be addressed can be identified.
Finally, Morton and Kirkwood's (2009) recommendations allow other individuals to
mitigate the power imbalance that can occur in rural communities. These
recommendations empower patients, administrators, and HCPs who may feel lower on
the HCP hierarchy to take action, as questioning and expecting a defence from an
objecting HCP becomes expected, and no longer simply an option that someone might
choose. In addition, HCPs who choose to object would receive greater protection,
because if the HCP defends his or her claims, the claims would need to be respected
regardless of whether those claims were based on religious or secular grounds. While this
final aspect would require more changes than the preceding two, this option both utilizes
the current recommendations from research and acknowledges the potential for rural
communities to take a lead in this area due to the already established lines for
communication. This recommendation addresses concerns regarding time limits, as the
process can be as brief as “doctor, I disagree because you have not considered that
patient’s expressed wish to exhaust all non-surgical options” to more in depth
discussions. It allows HCPs to continue honing ethical decision making skills and correct

4

When an HCP feels that they need to bend or break rules to protect duties to themselves or others.
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erroneous/superstitious beliefs that would normally go unrecognized or unchallenged.
Additionally, this system both protects the objector and also empowers those who may
previously have had little power or recourse in the situation (patients). By providing for
an environment where questioning and defence of conscientious objection is expected,
but also respected, the recommendation that policy makers and administrators take a
more active role is incorporated into the process of change.
When considering the example of the surgeon, these recommendations may allow for a
drastically different outcome. Instead of the surgeon's conscientious claim being
overruled, she might engage in dialogue with the patient's nurse which may elucidate an
erroneous sequence of reasoning and allow her to view the dilemma in light of the
acceptability of the surgery as opposed to making a judgements of the patient's valuation
of that surgery. Secondly, previous education and experience targeting ethical issues may
completely prevent the need for such dialogue by preparing the surgeon for a situation
where transfer of care is not the solution. Finally, be expecting an explanation for the
objection and expecting other staff to raise concerns and challenges a further opportunity
to correct erroneous assumptions occurs. Ultimately, the result is a low cost, time
effective solution that resolves an otherwise intractable ethical issue.

6.3 Principle 3
Human beings are social creatures with multiple competing loyalties and duties. HCPs
professional roles cannot be considered in exclusion to these competing interests,
especially in the rural setting where HCPs are (and need to be) integrated into the
community in multiple roles.

6.3.1

Health care providers face multiple competing duties

While major authorities in the conscientious objection discussion tend to discuss HCPs’
roles as if this was the HCP’s only responsibility, some authors (Sokol, 2006) have begun
to argue that this is a fallacious approach. Even when discussing the professional duties
of HCPs, competing obligations can muddy the decision-making process. HCPs are
obligated to their patients, their employer, and society simply within their professional
roles. Stepping outside of the professional obligations, most HCPs are also obligated to
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their communities (whether social, spiritual, etc.), families, and to their own belief system
or integrity. This is without considering research interests and other contending factors
that may be viewed negatively by some audiences. It is clear, the potential factors that
might play into any ethical decision are vast, and simply attempting to resolve an
ethically challenging situation in light of an HCP’s duties to a patient would not
ultimately consider the other important factors in creating a good ethical choice.

6.3.2

Patients have duties to their HCPs

Finally, patients, as members of their health care team and both their own and the HCP’s
community, province, country, have obligations to their HCPs. As discussed by Sokol
patients have a duty “not to require doctors to transcend the bounds of reasonable risk
during treatment and to respect and acknowledge their roles outside the realm of
medicine” (2006, p.1239), this also extends to other HCPs involved in patient care and
treatment. For example in extreme situations, such as Ebola and Marburg outbreaks,
where treating patients will result in negative HCP outcomes, expectations of HCPs
change (Sokol, 2006). This pattern of changing responsibilities based on the
circumstances is evident in other professions with similar life or death outcomes for
clients. Firefighters are not expected to enter a burning building, even if multiple people
might be saved, if the building is considered unsafe or at risk for collapsing or if the
firefighter does not have the necessary equipment. This is true even if the individuals die
and it is later determined that the building was safe. Firefighters are government
employees, paid for with social resources (as are many HCPs in Canada) with a
commitment to risk their lives for individuals in danger. However, that requirement is
mitigated by considerations outside of the immediate welfare of the individuals in a
particular fire situation. Similarly, a systematic method for determining similar
extenuating circumstances for HCPs is required, especially for HCPs in rural
communities who are more likely to encounter challenging situations.

6.4 Assessment
Together these principles suggest that current policies and procedures fail to meet the
moral requirements for protection of HCPs who express or experience conscientious
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objection in a rural setting when that objection is based on a centrally held value or
belief.
The recommended strategies for moving forward incorporate current research and
discussion on addressing the moral distress that can result from failure to respect these
conscientious objections. Furthermore, the recommendations in this thesis have been
shown to be both feasible and possible, and to consider the financial and time constraint
critiques raised against previous recommendations.
As such it is reasonable to conclude that failure to provide these or similar supports to
HCPs in rural settings, shows a failure to meet the obligations we as a society have to our
HCPs.

6.5 Conclusions and future possibilities for research
As discussed previously, current strategies for addressing the conscientious objection of a
nurse or physician in a rural community fall short of their intended purpose and new
strategies are needed that empower HCPs, patients, and administrators to hold each party
accountable for their actions. Current strategies are based on an urban model, which
neither accommodates the complexity of issues addressed in a rural setting, nor the time
limitations and power imbalances endemic to health care provision in the rural
environment. This thesis recommends respecting an HCP's right to conscientiously
object, when that objection is based on a core value or belief (as previously defined) and
puts the onus on that HCP to explain his or her reason for objecting. In addition, other
HCPs, administrators, and even patients are expected to provide their reasons for
disagreement to that HCP, creating a dialogue that will increase the ethical expertise of
each party and make areas of objection clear so that policy makers can adjust and amend
policies that routinely cause issue. This recommendation fits with the observed
interdependence of HCPs in a rural setting, while increasing the power of subordinates
and requiring a dialogue when an objection is raised, but also requiring the defended
conscientious objection be respected.
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The scope of this thesis did not allow for field research to test the recommendations, and
this limitation leaves the door open for future research to determine directly from rural
HCPs reasons for conscientious objection and the effectiveness of these
recommendations compared with current strategies. Further research into how rule
bending and failure to present controversial options to patients affects outcomes and care
for rural individuals, in contrast to current studies on urban populations, may also further
elucidate the need for this issue to be addressed. Research on HCP attrition from rural to
urban settings (as opposed to simply retiring from the field altogether), could also assist
retention efforts in rural and remote communities that are considered underserved. This
type of research should specifically consider the impact of issues of conscience and moral
distress.
The theoretical nature of this thesis, and the lack of previous field research on
conscientious objection in rural health care settings limit the conclusions that may be
drawn. In addition, the author is not an HCP, and therefore conclusions are drawn as an
outsider, dependent on published research, without direct insight into how HCPs think
and reason. However, this thesis calls to light a need for further research, and
demonstrates the error in creating policies and standards for rural health care practice
without inclusion of the rural setting in the development of those policies. Finally, WRE
can only provide an assessment of whether current strategies are ethical based on the
information currently available. WRE cannot overcome limitations inherent to a subject
where little direct research has previously been conducted.
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